Category Archives: Potential Risk of CVE

AMD ID: AMD-SB-7050: About Vector Value Injection in AMD CPUs, AMD believes that existing mitigation guidance for FPVI remains valid and covers VVI cases as well. What are your thoughts on this? (18th Mar 2026)

Background: The researchers’ paper introduces Vector Value Injection (VVI), which could allow an attacker with a deep understanding of microarchitectural behavior to inject values into vector registers during transient execution. Although they noted similarities with Floating Point Value Injection (FPVI), they reported Vector Value Injection as a new issue due to its capability to be triggered without denormal values as inputs.

AMD believes that VVI falls within the existing scope of CVE-2021-26314 (FPVI) as existing descriptions of FPVI do not specifically require denormal inputs. Additionally, AMD believes that existing mitigation guidance for FPVI remains valid and covers VVI cases as well.

Ref: CVE-2021-26314 – Potential floating point value injection in all supported CPU products, in conjunction with software vulnerabilities relating to speculative execution with incorrect floating point results, may cause the use of incorrect data from FPVI and may result in data leakage.

Official announcement: AMD ID: AMD-SB-7050 “Vector Value Injection in AMD CPUs”. Please refer to the link for details – https://www.amd.com/en/resources/product-security/bulletin/amd-sb-7050.html

CVE-2021-26314 is a vulnerability from five years ago; however, in today’s parallel environment, the situation may be different!

How does Parallel Processing handle “Different Types”?

When tasks are different (e.g., one calculates Pi, one downloads a file, one reads a database), the system handles them in three ways:

1.         Heterogeneous Task Assignment (Asynchronous):

Instead of using a “map” (which does the same thing to many items), we use apply_async. This allows Core 1 to run a “Math” function while Core 2 runs a “Data Backup” function simultaneously.

2.         OS Scheduling & Context Switching:

The Operating System (OS) is the “manager.” If Task A is waiting for a slow Hard Drive (I/O Bound), the OS immediately moves Task B (CPU Bound) onto that core so no time is wasted.

3.         Hardware Resource Partitioning:

On a chip like the 9995WX, different execution units inside the core can work at once. One part of the core handles Integer math, while another handles Floating Point (AVX-512). This allows the processor to crunch different types of data within the same clock cycle

Vector Value Injection integrated to pool.apply_async (which runs different functions simultaneously) cannot be curcumvented through Register Scrubbing or Control-Flow Enforcement (CET). In fact, manually assigning different functions using `apply_async’ lowers the defense level potentially.

Why apply_async May Lower the Defense Level?

When you use pool.apply_async to launch different functions, Python’s multiprocessing creates multiple independent OS Processes.

•          Expanded Attack Surface: Compared to a single-process loop, a multi-process environment increases the frequency of Inter-Process Communication (IPC). If an attacker leverages Vector Value Injection, they can hunt for vulnerabilities in the different logic paths of each unique function.

•          Context Switching Risks: Frequent task scheduling can increase the risk of Cache Side-channel leaks. These leaks can sometimes bypass Register Scrubbing protection by capturing data before it is cleared.

End of article

CVE-2026-0032 and CVE-2026-0038: Design weakness in Qualcomm SCM (Secure Channel Manager) and Qualcomm SCM/pKVM (Protected KVM). 17th Mar 2026

Preface: CVE-2026-0032 and CVE-2026-0038 are very similar in terms of their root cause, impact, and remedies, as they both originate from a logical error in the Android kernel memory protection subsystem.

Background: In the Android Virtualization Framework (AVF), all guest operating systems (like the main Android OS and Microdroid) run at EL1, while the actual hypervisor (pKVM) runs at EL2. In Android downstream kernels (especially those for Qualcomm or MediaTek SoCs), the log details containing 0x%llx (a 64-bit hexadecimal address) represent physical memory ranges being transitioned into an isolated state.

This isolation is a critical security layer used to protect high-value hardware components from the main Android OS.

Key Similarities – Both vulnerabilities reside in the mem_protect[.]c file, which is responsible for enforcing memory access boundaries and managing memory protection between different execution environments (like the kernel and the Secure World).

The “similar” nature of these design weakness lies in how the qcom_scm_assign_mem logic was implemented. In both cases, the system failed to properly validate or constrain memory assignment requests, allowing a local attacker to bypass security restrictions.

Vulnerability details:

CVE-2026-0032 In multiple functions of mem_protect[.]c, there is a possible out-of-bounds write due to a logic error in the code. This could lead to local escalation of privilege with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation.

Primary Driver – Qualcomm SCM (Secure Channel Manager)

CVE-2026-0038In multiple functions of mem_protect[.]c, there is a possible way to execute arbitrary code due to a logic error in the code. This could lead to local escalation of privilege with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation.

Primary Driver – Qualcomm SCM / pKVM (Protected KVM)

Official announcement: Please refer to the link for details –  

CVE-2026-0038 – https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-0038 CVE-2026-0032 – https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-0032

When I read the article titled “FortiGate Edge Intrusions Lead to Deep Network Compromise, Rogue Workstations” on technadu.com, I was very curious to know if it was true. (16th Mar 2026)

Preface: Quoting the second paragraph of the article: Because FortiOS uses reversible encryption ….

Please see the link for article details – https://www.technadu.com/fortigate-edge-intrusions-lead-to-deep-network-compromise-rogue-workstations/623060/

Using reversible encryption in a firewall—or any security system designed to protect credentials—is considered a major security risk because it essentially stores passwords in a format equivalent to plaintext. Reversible encryption allows the encrypted data to be decrypted back into its original form, meaning if an attacker compromises the system, they can obtain the original credentials, rather than just a non-reversible hash.

Background: In Active Directory (AD), abusing the mS-DS-MachineAccountQuota attribute means that an attacker uses its default value (usually 10) to allow ordinary low-privilege users to create new computer accounts in the domain.

A technique known as Resource-Limited Delegation (RBCD) attack. This is the most common form of abuse. If an attacker has specific privileges (such as GenericWrite) on a target server, they can use ms-DS-MachineAccountQuota to create a fake computer account and set it to “act on behalf of others,” thereby impersonating a domain administrator to log in to the target server.

CVE-2025-59718 and CVE-2025-59719 are critical authentication bypass vulnerabilities (CVSS score 9.8) that stem from improper verification of cryptographic signatures (CWE-347) within Fortinet’s SAML implementation

Why these vulnerabilities exist?

Signature Skipping: An unauthenticated remote attacker can send a specially crafted SAML message that the Fortinet device accepts without properly checking it against the trusted Identity Provider (IdP) certificate.

Improper Validation Logic: Because the system fails to correctly validate the XML Digital Signature, it does not confirm if the message actually came from the legitimate IdP or if it was modified in transit.

Administrative Access: By crafting a SAML response that claims to be from a trusted issuer (like sso.forticloud.com) and asserting a privileged identity (like super_admin), attackers can gain full administrative control over the device without needing a valid password or certificate. 

Official announcement: Please see the link for article details:

CVE-2025-59718 – https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-59718

CVE-2025-59719 – https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-59719

Remedial action:

-Perform the patch operation as recommended by the supplier.

-Use Powershell, Query accounts that have permissions for a specific object.

Get-DomainObjectAcl -Identity “TargetUser” -ResolveGUIDs | ? {$_.ActiveDirectoryRights -match “GenericWrite”}

-Disabling FortiCloud SSO immediately via the CLI (set admin-forticloud-sso-login disable) or GUI.

-Auditing logs for unauthorized administrative logins, particularly from unfamiliar IP addresses or at unusual times.

Explain the concept of design defect by combining CVE-2026-0006 and CVE-2026-21385 (12th Mar 2026)

Preface: The Mainline module (com[.]android[.]media[.]swcodec) contains software-onlycodecs. AMD does not touch these; they are strictly managed and updated by Google via the Play Store to ensure universal playback and security across all devices. For performance (like 4K video or gaming), AMD must provide its own hardware-accelerated codecs in the “vendor” partition of the device. To work with the Mainline system, AMD (or partners like those working on Android-x86) must implement Codec 2.0 (C2) drivers. This is the standard “language” the Android media framework uses to talk to any GPU—whether it’s Qualcomm, ARM, or AMD.

Background: Cybercriminals may exploit two design flaws to achieve their goals. Details are as follows:

Step 1. Entry Point: Malicious Media File

The user receives or encounters a specially crafted media file (e.g., via a messaging app or a website). No user interaction beyond opening the file or its preview is required.

Step 2. Step 1: Remote Code Execution (CVE-2026-0006)

Component: com[.]android[.]media[.]swcodec (Media Codecs Mainline).

Action: A heap buffer overflow occurs during the decoding process.

Result: The attacker gains System-level remote code execution. However, they are still “sandboxed” within the media process.

Step 3. Step 2: The “Zero-Copy” Hand-off (DMA-BUF)

Component: Codec 2.0 (C2) Driver Bridge.

Action: To maintain performance, the system uses DMA-BUF Heaps to pass the malicious buffer directly to the GPU without copying it.

Vulnerability Point: The system assumes the buffer boundaries are safe because they were “validated” by the software layer.

Step 4. Step 3: Privilege Escalation (CVE-2026-21385)

Vulnerability details:

CVE-2026-0006 (Critical System RCE): This is a heap buffer overflow in the Media Codecs Mainline component (com[.]android[.]media.swcodec). It allows for Remote Code Execution (RCE) without user interaction, often triggered by processing a specially crafted media file.

Official announcement: Please refer to the link for details –

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-0006

CVE-2026-21385 (High-Severity Qualcomm Graphics): This is a memory corruption flaw in a Qualcomm graphics/display component. It stems from an integer overflow during memory allocation, specifically related to how memory alignments are handled. 

Official announcement: Please refer to the link for details –

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-21385

CVE-2026-20660: A remote user may be able to write arbitrary files. This issue is fixed in macOS Tahoe 26.3, macOS Sonoma 14.8.4, iOS 18.7.5 and iPadOS 18.7.5, visionOS 26.3, iOS 26.3 and iPadOS 26.3, Safari 26.3. (10th Mar 2026)

Preface: App Groups provide the legal doorway for shared access, while libxpc’s path handling acts as the security guard ensuring no one sneaks a forbidden object through that door while it’s open.

Background: Libxpc is a closed-source system library in Apple iOS (and macOS) that powers the XPC (Cross Process Communication) framework. It enables secure, lightweight communication between different applications and system services, allowing processes to share data and perform tasks on behalf of one another. It is critical for app sandboxing, stability, and system security.

In Apple’s iOS, path handling within the libxpc library is a critical mechanism for ensuring that file paths are securely and accurately managed during communication between different processes.

The primary purposes and functions include: Security & Sandbox Enforcement, Privilege Isolation, Safe Resource Sharing, Service Discovery and Vulnerability Mitigation.

Remark: In system operations, CFNetwork frequently utilizes libxpc to execute specific tasks:

  • WebKit Networking: When browsers like Safari load pages, they use the com.apple.WebKit.Networking.xpc component to request resources. This involves CFNetwork communicating via XPC.
  • Background Transfers: For background downloads or syncs, CFNetwork interacts with system network daemons through XPC connections to maintain the session while the app is suspended.

Vulnerability detail: A path handling issue was addressed with improved logic. This issue is fixed in macOS Tahoe 26.3, macOS Sonoma 14.8.4, iOS 18.7.5 and iPadOS 18.7.5, visionOS 26.3, iOS 26.3 and iPadOS 26.3, Safari 26.3. A remote user may be able to write arbitrary files.

NVD Published Date: 02/11/2026
NVD Last Modified: 02/13/2026

Official announcement: Please refer to the link for details –

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-20660

CVE-2026-20667: About Apple iOS 26.3, iPadOS 26.3A….., logic issue was addressed with improved checks. (9th Mar 2026)

Preface: As of March 8, 2026, Apple had released iOS 26.3.1 between March 4 and 5, 2026. Although you saw related news on March 7, this version mainly focused on bug fixes and performance optimizations for the major update released a few days earlier. The focus of this discussion is sandbox escape.

Background: iOS uses a centralized, kernel-level sandboxing system (Sandbox.kext) for all apps, primarily relying on a single default, complex profile named container.sb for all third-party applications. While the container is standard, iOS dynamically applies unique sandbox profiles to individual processes to restrict file system, hardware, and network access.

Apple states that App Groups allow multiple apps and extensions to access a shared container and perform interprocess communication.

That means:

  • App ✅
  • Widget ✅
  • Extension ✅
    …can all touch the same file path, simultaneously, in different processes.

The sandbox permits this — it does not serialize it for you.

Vulnerability details: A logic issue was addressed with improved checks. This issue is fixed in watchOS 26.3, macOS Tahoe 26.3, macOS Sonoma 14.8.4, macOS Sequoia 15.7.4, iOS 26.3 and iPadOS 26.3. An app may be able to break out of its sandbox.

Official announcement: Please refer to the link for details – https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-20667

The official description of CVE-2026-3543 only states “Inappropriate implementation in V8” (5th Mar 2026)

Preface: V8 is Google’s open-source, high-performance JavaScript and WebAssembly engine, written in C++, that powers Chrome and Node.js by translating JavaScript directly into native machine code. It implements all ECMA-262 ECMAScript standards, including data types, operators, objects, and functions, while optimizing execution via the V8 Ignition interpreter and V8 TurboFan compiler.

Background: In the V8 JavaScript engine, dictionary mode (also known as “slow mode”) is an internal representation for objects where properties are stored and accessed using a hash map-like structure. This mode is less optimized for property access compared to the “fast mode” (where objects are treated like fixed C-style structs) but offers better performance for objects that have their shape (set of properties) change frequently at runtime.

The Assumption: V8 believes the object is still in the “Fast Mode” layout (fixed offset) as seen in your code.

The Reality: Through a specific trick (like adding too many properties or a specific transition), the object has been forced into Dictionary Mode.

The Crash: If V8 fails to “de-optimize” and continues to use the fixed-offset logic on a Dictionary-layout object, it accesses the wrong memory address, leading to Out-of-Bounds (OOB) Access.

Vulnerability details: Inappropriate implementation in V8 in Google Chrome prior to 145.0.7632.159 allowed a remote attacker to potentially perform out of bounds memory access via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High)

Official announcement: Please refer to the link for details –

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-3543

CVE-2025-47373: About Qualcomm – Fixed a typical type Confusion or an Improper Bounds Check within the firmware’s protocol stack. (5th Mar 2026)

Preface: 5G Timing Advance (TA) invocation is a mechanism where the base station (gNB) instructs user equipment (UE) to advance its uplink transmission timing to compensate for signal propagation delays. This synchronization ensures that signals from UEs at different distances arrive at the gNB within the same time slot, preventing interference.

Background: In the 5G NR (New Radio) 4-step RACH (Random Access Channel) procedure, TA (Timing Advance) is a critical parameter provided within Msg2, also known as the Random Access Response (RAR). For NR Random Access Response (Msg2):

RAR payload = exactly 7 bytes (56 bits)

  • 12-bit Timing Advance Command
  • 27-bit Uplink Grant
  • 16-bit Temporary C-RNTI

Plus 1 byte MAC subheader (RAPID)

Total bytes read by UE MAC = 8 bytes per RAR

This is fixed by spec. There is no variable-length TA field in Msg2. The TA length is always 12 bits in RAR

Vulnerability details: CVE-2025-47373. This is a classic case of Type Confusion or an Improper Bounds Check within the firmware’s protocol stack. In the context of Qualcomm modem components (like those in the Snapdragon 8 Gen 3), when the firmware confuses these two differently-sized TA fields, it creates a significant security vulnerability.

Why this constitutes a CVE Vulnerability? If the firmware reuses the same handler or buffer without validating the context (RAR vs. MAC CE), it leads to:

  • Integer Overflow/Truncation: Forcing a 12-bit RAR TA (up to 3846) into a logic path or variable expected to be 6-bit (0-63) causes data corruption in the accumulator.
  • Buffer Overflow: If the 12-bit data is written into a memory structure (like a bit-field or a small array) designed only for 6-bit values, it will overwrite adjacent memory.
  • Out-of-bounds (OOB) Write: In the Snapdragon scheduling logic, TA values are often used to calculate offsets in timing tables. An unvalidated 12-bit value can cause a pointer to point outside the intended buffer.

Official announcement: Please refer to the link for details –

https://docs.qualcomm.com/securitybulletin/march-2026-bulletin.html

CVE-2025-47378: Exposure of Sensitive System Information to an Unauthorized Control Sphere in HLOS – Cryptographic Issue when a shared VM reference (4th Mar 2026)

Preface: Qualcomm’s pVM (Protected Virtual Machine) refers to the secure, isolated virtual machine environment supported by the Gunyah hypervisor. PVMFW (pVM Firmware) is the specific binary code (pvmfw.bin) executed first within a pVM to bootstrap secure boot, validate the environment, and derive unique secrets for that specific guest. In short, pVM is the container, while pvmfw is the secure bootloader for that container.

Background: To “read the memory” of a Microdroid pVM from the host, you cannot bypass the hypervisor’s isolation. Instead, you must use Binder RPC (over virtio-vsock) to request data from a service running inside the pVM. Qualcomm’s sensitive keys (such as encryption keys and passwords) are typically stored in its Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) or a dedicated RPMB (Replay Protected Memory Block) partition. The RPMB is a hardware partition on the storage chip. It is managed and “owned” by the TEE (Secure World), while the EL1 Kernel and EL2 Hypervisor serve only as communication bridges for data transit.

Remark: Refer to the attached diagram, the AIDL code design follows the standard RPC (Remote Procedure Call) pattern. The fundamental “design limitation” here is that the Guest (Microdroid) must trust the Hypervisor (EL2) to enforce the boundaries.

If CVE-2025-47378 is present:

1.Your readData function is “truthful” and only returns 1024 bytes.

2.However, the Host app uses the Hypervisor flaw to read the other memory in your pVM where your actual secrets (keys, sensitive processing) might be stored.

Vulnerability details: Cryptographic Issue when a shared VM reference allows HLOS to boot loader and access cert chain.

Official announcement: Please refer to the link for details – https://docs.qualcomm.com/product/publicresources/securitybulletin/march-2026-bulletin.html

CVE-2026-20674: Sensitive information could potentially be accessed through Accessibility services while the device is locked. This issue is fixed in iOS 26.3 and iPadOS 26.3. (3rd Mar 2026)

Preface: In iOS development, CVE-2026-20674 relates to a security vulnerability where sensitive information could potentially be accessed through Accessibility services while the device is locked.

Background: UIApplication.shared.isProtectedDataAvailable

impacts the iOS lockscreen because it directly reflects whether user-encrypted data (Keychain, files) is accessible based on the device’s lock status. When locked, this returns false, causing apps launched in the background (e.g., via notifications or prewarming) to fail to read sensitive data, potentially leading to incorrect states or user logouts. 

Key reasons for the impact:

  • Encrypted Data Lock: Files protected with NSDataWritingFileProtectionComplete or NSDataWritingFileProtectionCompleteUnlessOpen are inaccessible until the user unlocks the device.
  • Background Launch Failures: If an app is launched in the background (e.g., notification, Live Activity) while the screen is locked, attempts to read credentials from the Keychain or files will return nil, potentially causing the user to be signed out.
  • State Corruption: Initializing data or reading from UserDefaults while the device is locked might read empty/default values, allowing the app to incorrectly overwrite existing secure data. 

Vulnerability details: A privacy issue was addressed by removing sensitive data. This issue is fixed in iOS 26.3 and iPadOS 26.3. An attacker with physical access to a locked device may be able to view sensitive user information.

Official announcement: Please refer to the link for details.

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-20674