Category Archives: Potential Risk of CVE

AI and ML, Cell Phone (iPhone, Android, windows mobile), IoT, Network (Protocol, Topology & Standard), Potential Risk of CVE

CVE-2026-46300 (Fragnesia) is a Linux kernel privilege escalation in the XFRM ESP-in-TCP subsystem. Does it affect GX-grade supercomputers? (18th May 2026)

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Preface: If BlueField DPU supports configuring IPsec rules using strongSwan 5.9.0bf, does it use kernel IPsec in ARM?

Yes, when using strongSwan 5.9.0bf on the BlueField DPU, it utilizes the Linux kernel IPsec stack (xfrm) running on the ARM cores to manage and configure security associations, which can then be offloaded to the hardware acceleration engines.

Background: The only scenario where a GPU or advanced SoC interacts with the Linux kernel’s XFRM subsystem is during IPsec Network Offloading (SmartNICs / DPUs).

If an enterprise SoC or Data Processing Unit (like an NVIDIA BlueField DPU) handles high-speed network traffic, the Linux XFRM subsystem can act as a control plane. It passes the encryption policies (SAs and SPIs) down to the chip’s network engine so that standard internet IPsec traffic can be encrypted at wire speed directly on the network interface card (NIC) hardware rather than taxing the main host CPU.

Vulnerability details: Fragnesia is a Linux local privilege escalation vulnerability that is a member of the Dirty Frag vulnerability class.

Are there any remedies available for CVE-2026-46300?

Patch Your Kernel:

Update your Linux kernel immediately. Patches were released by major distributions (AlmaLinux, Ubuntu, Red Hat, Debian, Amazon Linux) around May 14-16, 2026.

Apply Temporary Mitigation (If Patching is Delayed): Disable the vulnerable modules (esp4, esp6, and rxrpc) to block the exploit.Run: sudo rmmod esp4 esp6 rxrpcCreate blacklist file: echo -e “install esp4 /bin/false\ninstall esp6 /bin/false\ninstall rxrpc /bin/false” | sudo tee /etc/modprobe[.]d/fragnesia[.]conf

Clear Page Cache: If you suspect a machine was targeted before patching, run sync; echo 3 | sudo tee /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches to evict potentially corrupted cached pages.

Official announcement: Please refer to the link for details – https://github.com/v12-security/pocs/tree/main/fragnesia

AI and ML, Cell Phone (iPhone, Android, windows mobile), IoT, Potential Risk of CVE

CVE-2026-43284: Dirty Frag tricks the IPsec/TCP stack into doing the “dirty work”(13th May 2026)

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Preface: The “Dirty Frag” attack chains two separate flaws in the Linux kernel’s networking stack: one in the ESP(Encapsulating Security Payload) protocol used by IPsec and another in the RxRPC protocol used for the AFS distributed file system. If you do not use IPsec, disabling its modules removes one of the major attack paths.

Background: The “Dirty Frag” vulnerability is deemed difficult to patch immediately due to its exploitation of a long-standing core Linux kernel optimization, which initially lacked official, widespread patches upon disclosure. While disabling ESP modules helps, effective mitigation requires blacklisting both ESP and RxRPC modules, or patching the kernel directly.

How to mitigate vulnerabilities:

Step 1:Block the ESP and RxRPC modules: Create a configuration file (e.g., /etc/modprobe.d/dirtyfrag.conf) to ensure the modules cannot be auto-loaded by an exploit:

bash

install esp4 /bin/false
install esp6 /bin/false
install rxrpc /bin/false

Step 2:Unload current modules: Remove the modules if they are currently active in memory:

bash

sudo modprobe -r esp4 esp6 rxrpc
 

Step 3:Clear the Page Cache: The exploit works by corrupting the page cache. After applying the blocks, clear the cache to ensure no malicious changes persist in RAM:

bash

sudo sync && echo 3 | sudo tee /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches
 

Official announcement: Please refer to the link for details – https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-43284

Potential Risk of CVE

CVE-2026-0300: Best practice guidelines remediate design weakness for PAN-OS software (11th May 2026)

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Preface: Nginx in PAN-OS assists in routing traffic to backend management components, such as those responsible for user authentication and Captive Portal functionality.

Background: Palo Alto Networks firewalls can intercept HTTP and HTTPS traffic from unauthenticated users and redirect them to an internal web server (the Authentication Portal) to collect credentials and establish a user-to-IP mapping.

This feature, now known as the Authentication Portal (formerly Captive Portal), is designed to enforce security policies based on user identity, particularly for guest or BYOD users.

Vulnerability details: A buffer overflow vulnerability in the User-ID™ Authentication Portal (aka Captive Portal) service of Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS software allows an unauthenticated attacker to execute arbitrary code with root privileges on the PA-Series and VM-Series firewalls by sending specially crafted packets. The risk of this issue is greatly reduced if you secure access to the User-ID™ Authentication Portal per the best practice guidelines.

Why is CVE-2026-0300 Rated So High?

Even though it involves the User-ID Authentication Portal, which is not always internet-facing, it receives a near-perfect score because:

  • Unauthenticated Root Access: An attacker does not need to be an admin. They simply send specially crafted packets to the portal to trigger a buffer overflow.
  • Zero Interaction: The attack happens silently without any user having to click a link or log in.

High Impact: Once exploited, the attacker gains root control of the firewall. According to Unit 42, attackers have used this to enumerate Active Directory, steal credentials, and destroy logs.

Official announcement: Please refer to the link for details – https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-0300

Impacted Devices:

  • PA-Series and VM-Series firewalls.
  • Prisma Access and Cloud NGFW are reported to be unaffected

IoT, Potential Risk of CVE

CVE-2026-25293 – Incorrect authorization in PLC FW (7th May 2026)

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Preface: Qualcomm chipsets contain Powerline Communication (PLC) firmware features, particularly within their automotive and IoT-focused product lines designed for smart grid and electric vehicle (EV) charging.

Background: To implement write protection for SPI Flash, you generally need a combination of Hardware WP# pins and Software Status Register configurations.

The SPI Flash physical and software protection bits (BP bits / WP# pin) failed to provide a complete write-lock across the device lifecycle.

The threat model for CVE-2026-25293 usually assumes an attacker targets the PIB (Parameter Information Block):

•       Malicious PIB Modification: If WP is not active, an attacker can change MAC addresses or security keys in the PIB to conduct Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attacks and steal charging credentials.

•       Persistent Backdoor: By overwriting sections of the NVM code (made possible because BP bits = 0), an attacker can implant a persistent backdoor that survives a reboot.

Vulnerability Details:

Title – Incorrect authorization in PLC FW

Description – Buffer overflow due to incorrect authorization in PLC FW

Technology Area – PLC FW

Vulnerability Type – CWE-863

Access Vector – Remote

Security Rating – Critical

Official announcement: Please refer to the link for details – https://docs.qualcomm.com/securitybulletin/may-2026-bulletin.html

Remedy: The primary remedy is to update the affected PLC firmware to the latest version supplied by the vendor that specifically addresses this CVE.

IoT, Potential Risk of CVE

CVE-2026-25254: Improper authorization in Qualcomm Software Center (6th May 2026)

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Preface: Even though QSC is installed on your Windows or Linux PC, its primary mission is to manage the Linux operating system that lives on your Target Development Board. QSC v1.21.0 knows exactly how to handle projects based on “Long Term Support Kernels” and provides the specific tools and patches required for them.

Background: To enable this within your qsc-cli workspace, follow these steps to modify your build configuration:

Step 1. Log in to the CLI
bash

qsc-cli login -u <your_email_address>

Step 2. In the context of the Qualcomm QRB4210 (RB2) and the Qualcomm Linux SDK, “enabling the SocketIO interface” typically refers to configuring a high-speed communication transport layer used in the Robot Operating System (ROS) or for high-speed sensor data between subsystems.

To enable this within your qsc-cli workspace, follow these steps to modify your build configuration:

Step 3. Identify the Required Metadata Layer

Socket-based transport optimizations, such as QRB ROS transport for zero-copy message passing, are often contained in the Qualcomm Intelligent Robotics (QIRP) SDK layers. Ensure you have the meta-qcom-qirp (or similar) layer in your workspace

Step 4. Update your bblayers.conf

Step 5. Enable via Kernel Menuconfig (If Hardware Socket/Interface)

If you are referring to a specific hardware-backed socket interface (like a virtualized socket for a DSP or NPU), you may need to enable it in the kernel:

Enter your build environment via qsc-cli.

Run the devtool to modify the kernel configuration:

Bash

devtool menuconfig linux-qcom-base

Search (using /) for SOCKET or the specific interface driver name (e.g., AF_QIPCRTR for Qualcomm IPC Router sockets).

Set it to <*>

Vulnerability details: Improper authorization in Qualcomm Software Center

Description : Improper authorization leads to Remote Code Execution via SocketIO interface.

Official announcement: Please refer to the link for details –

https://docs.qualcomm.com/securitybulletin/may-2026-bulletin.html

AI and ML, Potential Risk of CVE

To address the vulnerability identified in CVE-2026-24222 (and the related SSRF risk in CVE-2026-24231) – 5th May -2026

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Preface: While NVIDIA has not “dropped” support for the core OpenClaw framework, in some specific cases they have moved away from its standard form.

Background: Because NemoClaw “bakes” certain variables into the sandbox configuration during onboarding, if they are not correctly scoped or sanitized, they remain accessible to the agent process even though it should be isolated.

As a result, this allows an attacker to exfiltrate critical secrets (like the NVIDIA_API_KEY or TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN mentioned) through the agent’s existing communication channels.

To address the vulnerability identified in CVE-2026-24222 (and the related SSRF risk in CVE-2026-24231), admin should use the following CLI flags during sandbox creation or update. These flags, introduced in NemoClaw v0.0.18, are designed to strictly control which host environment variables are “baked” into the sandbox environment.

For details, see attached diagram.

Vulnerability details:

CVE-2026-2422 NVIDIA NemoClaw contains a vulnerability in the sandbox environment initialization component where a remote attacker may cause improper access control by sending prompt-injected content that causes the agent to read and exfiltrate host environment variables not properly restricted during sandbox creation. A successful exploit of this vulnerability may lead to information disclosure.

CVE-2026-24231 NVIDIA NemoClaw contains a vulnerability in the validateEndpointUrl() SSRF protection component where an attacker may cause a server-side request forgery by supplying a crafted endpoint URL referencing the 0[.]0[.]0[.]0/8 address range via a blueprint configuration file or CLI flag. A successful exploit of this vulnerability may lead to information disclosure.

Official announcement: Please refer to the link for details – https://nvidia.custhelp.com/app/answers/detail/a_id/5837

Recommended Action:
NVIDIA has released a software update for NVIDIA NemoClaw to address this issue. Users should update to version v0.0.18 or later immediately, as the privilege escalation fixes are critical.

Potential Risk of CVE

CVE-2026-31431: Copy Fail, a module designed to ensure security (encryption), has become a tool used to undermine security (4th May 2026)

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Preface: The algif_aead module is a Linux-specific component of the AF_ALG socket interface. It is rarely the primary choice for application-level encryption even on Linux, and it has no direct equivalent in the architecture of Apple’s iOS XNU kernel.

Background: The use of algif_aead is a niche architectural choice for several reasons:

Platform Dependency: It is part of the Linux Kernel Crypto API. Apps targeting multiple platforms (Android, iOS, Windows) prefer cross-platform libraries like OpenSSL, BoringSSL, or libsodium to avoid writing platform-specific kernel interface code.

The specified design weakness (Copy Fail) in the Linux kernel allows a local attacker to overwrite read-only files by manipulating the page cache via splice() and the AF_ALG (kernel crypto) interface.

Ref: This exploit allows a write to the page cache of that file. This explains how a read-only file gets “overwritten” in memory, which is the “magic” of this vulnerability.

Vulnerability details: In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: crypto: algif_aead – Revert to operating out-of-place This mostly reverts commit 72548b093ee3 except for the copying of the associated data. There is no benefit in operating in-place in algif_aead since the source and destination come from different mappings. Get rid of all the complexity added for in-place operation and just copy the AD directly.

Official announcement: Please refer to link for details – https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31431

Cell Phone (iPhone, Android, windows mobile), Potential Risk of CVE

The “ghost data” issue has been fixed in iOS 18.7.8 and iPadOS 18.7.8, as well as iOS 26.4.2 and iPadOS 26.4.2 on 24th Apr 2026. Did you receive same update alert again on 1st of May 2026? (2nd May 2026)

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Preface: My iPhone 15 pushed the iOS 26.4.2 update again on May 2, 2026. I think even if you installed it around April 24—is likely because Apple released a revised build of that same update to address continued issues, or my device failed to properly register the previous installation due to the emergency nature of the patch.

Background: Why I received the update again on 1st May 2026. The NVD’s last modified date is shown as April 29, 2026. Therefore, this is one of the reasons why I need to perform the analysis again. Why update again? Similar to previous scenarios in 2023, Apple often re-issues critical patches if the first version did not fully resolve the issue, was causing compatibility problems, or if new information about the vulnerability arose.

My observation: The April 29 update reinforces why your switch to PRAGMA secure_delete = ON; is the right move. The official fix description—”improved data redaction”—aligns with the behavior of secure_delete, which physically overwrites data to ensure it cannot be recovered via forensic tools.

By using the PRAGMA, you are implementing at the application level what Apple has now implemented at the OS level: ensuring that when a record is “deleted,” its physical remnants are immediately destroyed.

The following URL is the analysis report I published on April 24, 2026 – http://www.antihackingonline.com/cell-phone-iphone-android-windows-mobile/the-ghost-data-issue-has-been-fixed-in-ios-18-7-8-and-ipados-18-7-8-as-well-as-ios-26-4-2-and-ipados-26-4-2-24th-apr-2026/

Official announcement: Please refer to the link for details – https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-28950

AI and ML, Potential Risk of CVE

CVE-2026-24178: About NVIDIA NVFlare Dashboard (29th Apr 2026)

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Preface: NVIDIA FLARE allows research and data scientists to adapt existing ML/DL workflow to federated learning paradigm.

Background: A critical Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) vulnerability was identified in the NVIDIA NVFlare Dashboard (CVE-2026-24178). In federated learning environments—where privacy is paramount (e.g., HIPAA-compliant medical research)—this flaw allowed unauthorized users to bypass access controls and interact with data belonging to other participants.

The Dashboard’s RESTful API previously relied on user-supplied identifiers (such as job_id or user_id) to retrieve records. While the system verified that a user was logged in (Authentication), it failed to verify if that user actually owned or was authorized to access the specific record requested (Authorization). This allowed an attacker to simply change a numeric ID in an API request to view, modify, or delete sensitive information outside their scope.

Vulnerability details: NVIDIA NVFlare Dashboard contains a vulnerability in the user management and authentication system where an unauthenticated attacker may cause authorization bypass through user-controlled key. A successful exploit of this vulnerability may lead to privilege escalation, data tampering, information disclosure, code execution, and denial of service.

Remediation: The Patch
The vulnerability is fully addressed in NVIDIA FLARE SDK v2.7.2. The fix implements Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC) by:

  • Decoupling Trust: The backend no longer trusts the ID provided in the request URL/body as the sole source of authority.
  • Enforcing Ownership: Every database query now automatically injects an owner_id or org_id filter derived from a secure, server-side session.
  • Silent Rejection: Unauthorized requests now correctly return a 403 Forbidden error, ensuring data isolation between collaborating parties.

Official announcement: Please refer to the link for details –

https://nvidia.custhelp.com/app/answers/detail/a_id/5819

AI and ML, Potential Risk of CVE

CVE-2026-7191: Static-eval npm package in qnabot-on-aws versions 7.2.4 and earlier design weakness (28th Apr 2026)

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Preface: Self-service AI is a technology that uses AI techniques (such as chatbots, natural language processing (NLP), and machine learning) to enable customers to solve problems or find information themselves anytime, anywhere, without interacting with human customer service. It acts as a digital agent, providing instant assistance through channels such as websites, instant messaging applications, and voice systems.

Background: In the context of Amazon Content Designer, the result of using static-eval depends entirely on the AST (Abstract Syntax Tree) generated from your string and the Context (variables) you provide. The primary goal of static-eval is to return a plain JavaScript value without using the dangerous eval() function.

An Abstract Syntax Tree (AST) in the context of static evaluation (static-eval) is a hierarchical, tree-structured representation of source code that captures its logical and structural meaning without requiring the code to be executed.

In static analysis, the code is parsed into this tree format, allowing tools to traverse, analyze, and manipulate the structure to find potential bugs, security vulnerabilities, or styling issues before runtime.

Vulnerability details: Improper use of the static-eval npm package in the open source solution qnabot-on-aws versions 7.2.4 and earlier may allow an authenticated administrator to execute arbitrary code within the fulfillment Lambda execution context by injecting a crafted conditional chaining expression via the Content Designer interface, which bypasses the intended expression sandbox through JavaScript prototype manipulation. This may grant direct access to backend resources (Lambda environment variables, OpenSearch indices, S3 objects, DynamoDB tables) that are not exposed through normal administrative interfaces. We recommend you upgrade to version 7.3.0 or above.

Official announcement: Please refer to link for details –

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-7191