Preface: The “2025” in the CVE ID means the vulnerability was first discovered, reported, or reserved in 2025. Why Critical Vulnerabilities “Stay Silent”? If a zero-day is announced before a patch exists, every hacker in the world learns exactly how to exploit millions of devices. Keeping it confidential gives engineers time to build and test a fix. Companies like Google typically get 90 days from private discovery to patch a flaw. If a flaw is highly complex or found late in 2025, the timeline naturally pushes the patch and public announcement into 2026.

Background: To understand how the Android Java API framework abstracts low-level Linux kernel operations without manually tracking byte allocation, you need to use Java Native Interface (JNI) or Foreign Function & Memory API (Project Panama) to wrap native file systems and system calls (like open, read, ioctl, or tracking /proc/ entries) into high-level Java objects.

In the Android Java API framework, graphical and shared hardware memory allocation is managed via subsystems like android.hardware or android.graphics. While the framework defines dimensions in Java objects, it relies on underlying native Linux kernel layers (like ION or DMA-BUF) for physical memory mapping, creating critical dependency boundaries.

The Vulnerable Mechanism (see diagram – point 2)

The emulated code snippet (AndroidHardwareBufferEmulation) captures the exact boundary risk:

•               Java-to-Native Delegation: Java code frequently acts as a controller that forwards sizing metrics (width, height, formatFlags) down to underlying native C++ buffers (like /dev/ion or dma_buf).

•               Trusting Input Sizing: If the Java side does not perform strict bounds checking on these dimensions before asking the native layer to handle them, it sets the stage for an exploit.

Vulnerability details: In multiple locations, there is a possible way to achieve code execution due to an integer overflow. This could lead to local escalation of privilege with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation.

Official announcement: Please refer to the link for details – https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-48595

Recommended Actions – Update Android Devices: Immediately check for and install the June 2026 Android security patch level (2026-06-01 or 2026-06-05) via Settings > System > System update.

Preface: MacOS Tahoe (version 26, specifically updates 26.1 and 26.2 released in late 2025) is designed for a broad range of Apple Silicon and select Intel-based Mac computers. Key Supported Apple Products (as of late 2025/early 2026) includes MacBook Neo (2026), MacBook Air, MacBook Pro, iMac: 2020 and later models, Mac mini 2020 and later models, Mac Studio 2022 and later models, Mac Pro 2019 and later models. However, on June 2, 2026, Apple released an update; it is version 26.5.1 (25F80).

Background: There is no public code for processing BackBoardServices within an App Sandbox. BackBoardServices is a private, internal Apple framework (like SpringBoard) primarily used for system-level daemon communication (e.g., backboardd). Sandboxed apps are explicitly denied access to these services due to security and privacy restrictions.

Attempting to call these private methods will result in immediate Sandbox: deny(1) errors in your Console logs. While accessing BackBoardServices is not feasible for standard applications, developers typically utilize the Objective-C runtime and XPC to interact with it for jailbreak tweaks or security research.

Ref: BackBoardServices is an internal Apple framework responsible for handling low-level hardware input events (such as touches, clicks, and device orientation) and managing system power. It requires a sandbox in macOS for two primary reasons: privilege isolation and user privacy protection.

Technical details: Based on the information provided regarding the macOS Tahoe 26.5.1 (25F80) release on June 2, 2026, it is not uncommon for minor revision updates (dot-dot releases) to be released without dedicated CVE entries if they contain only stability improvements, bug fixes, or non-security-related code changes.

Apple has addressed critical BackBoardServices spanning sandbox escapes in older, supported iterations of Tahoe (such as 26.1 and 26.2). Sandbox escape found. It allow unauthorized applications to bypass Apple’s security sandbox, potentially gaining access to sensitive user data or system resources.

Remedy: If you are using devices running 26.1 or 26.2, it is highly recommended to update to the latest available version (26.5.1) to secure these vulnerabilities.

Preface: Apple does not officially describe itself as a “walled garden.” Instead, that term is used by analysts, journalists, and critics to describe Apple’s tightly controlled ecosystem, where hardware, software, and services are designed to work together exclusively.

Background: Why Network Extensions Crashed M5 Macs?

This internal memory filtering is precisely why traditional network content filters caused M5 Macs to crash prior to the macOS Tahoe 26.5.1 update.

Network filtering apps monitor deep kernel-level web traffic, meaning they constantly look at low-level system memory. Older iterations of these network extensions were attempting to read raw packet data in unified memory using pointers that lacked the strict, hardware-enforced M5 cryptographic tags. The M5 chip assumed a cyberattack was underway and instantly shut the entire computer down to maintain total data confidentiality.

How MIE Filters Memory Inside the M5 Silicon

Traditional operating systems rely entirely on software code to ensure one app does not touch another app’s memory data. MIE shifts this burden entirely to physical chip components. It is built upon ARM’s Enhanced Memory Tagging Extension (EMTE) operating in a strict, performance-optimized “synchronous mode”.

Information Details: The macOS Tahoe 26.5.1 (Build 25F80) update, released on June 2, 2026, focuses on enterprise fixes rather than (published) CVE security vulnerabilities. It resolves an issue causing unexpected shutdowns on M5 Macs when utilizing specific content-filtering network extensions.

Details of the 26.5.1 (25F80) Update:

• Release Date: June 2, 2026
• Published CVEs: None

Primary Fix: Addressed a critical issue for enterprise users where Macs featuring the M5 chip would abruptly shut down when handling certain content-filtering network extensions.

Ref: The macOS Tahoe 26.5.1 (Build 25F80) update, released on June 2, 2026, focuses on enterprise fixes rather than (published) CVE security vulnerabilities.

About other updates coming at the same time: macOS 26.5.1: Build 25F80 iOS 26.5.1 / iPadOS 26.5.1: Build 23F81

End of article.

Preface: In iOS, the microkernel component (Mach) does not communicate with user space from a separate address space. Instead, it communicates directly within a unified kernel space alongside monolithic components, bypassing the traditional performance costs of a pure microkernel.

While iOS runs on an ARM-based architecture (Apple Silicon), its operating system core, XNU (“X is Not Unix”), is a hybrid kernel. It integrates the Mach microkernel with a monolithic BSD layer and the I/O Kitdriver framework into a single, highly privileged address space. 

Background: If a specific, complex code path inside a kernel subsystem utilizes an object but contains a logic error that forgets to call the appropriate reference increment function (e.g., ipc_port_reference()), the reference count drops to zero prematurely when another thread requests a deletion.

The Result: The kernel safely deletes the object according to its counters, but the flawed subsystem still holds a raw C pointer to that memory address. When the subsystem eventually attempts to write data to that pointer, it performs an out-of-bounds write into memory that may now contain entirely different data.

Vulnerability details: An out-of-bounds write issue was addressed with improved input validation. This issue is fixed in iOS 18.7.9 and iPadOS 18.7.9, iOS 26.5 and iPadOS 26.5, macOS Sequoia 15.7.7, macOS Sonoma 14.8.7, macOS Tahoe 26.5, tvOS 26.5, visionOS 26.5, watchOS 26.5. An app may be able to cause unexpected system termination or write kernel memory.

Official announcement: Please refer to the link for details – https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-28972

Preface: My iPhone 15 pushed the iOS 26.4.2 update again on May 2, 2026. I think even if you installed it around April 24—is likely because Apple released a revised build of that same update to address continued issues, or my device failed to properly register the previous installation due to the emergency nature of the patch.

Background: Why I received the update again on 1st May 2026. The NVD’s last modified date is shown as April 29, 2026. Therefore, this is one of the reasons why I need to perform the analysis again. Why update again? Similar to previous scenarios in 2023, Apple often re-issues critical patches if the first version did not fully resolve the issue, was causing compatibility problems, or if new information about the vulnerability arose.

My observation: The April 29 update reinforces why your switch to PRAGMA secure_delete = ON; is the right move. The official fix description—”improved data redaction”—aligns with the behavior of secure_delete, which physically overwrites data to ensure it cannot be recovered via forensic tools.

By using the PRAGMA, you are implementing at the application level what Apple has now implemented at the OS level: ensuring that when a record is “deleted,” its physical remnants are immediately destroyed.

The following URL is the analysis report I published on April 24, 2026 – http://www.antihackingonline.com/cell-phone-iphone-android-windows-mobile/the-ghost-data-issue-has-been-fixed-in-ios-18-7-8-and-ipados-18-7-8-as-well-as-ios-26-4-2-and-ipados-26-4-2-24th-apr-2026/

Official announcement: Please refer to the link for details – https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-28950