Category Archives: Potential Risk of CVE

CVE-2022-31711 – VMware vRealize Log Insight 8.x prior to 8.10.2 (Updated On: 2023-01-31)

Preface: As time goes by, Log management is a mandatory setting in the digital world. Log management core architecture design involves a lot of software design. Therefore, you will be exposed to different forms of cyber attacks. So you need to watch out and protect yourself from harm.

Background: Log Insight includes the following key capabilities
• Integrates with VMware vRealize Operations™ to bring unstructured and structured data together, for significantly enhanced end-to-end operations management.

System Features:
Web Hooks supports additional alerting extensibility into Slack,etc.
• Simple Query API adds support for simple keyword search, complex queries, integration with CMDBs, external UI analysis,etc.
• Support for pure IPV6 environment – both server and agent side.
• Server side Agent upgrades – supports automatic agent upgrades

Remark: Working with webhooks exposes an HTTP endpoint that can be called from any actor on your server. Without appropriate measures, this could be extremely unsafe. For example: A man-in-the-middle attack is a vulnerability where a third party obtains access to your webhook data by capturing and reading the request.

Vulnerability details: VMware vRealize Log Insight contains an Information Disclosure Vulnerability. A malicious actor can remotely collect sensitive session and application information without authentication.

Affected Versions: VMware vRealize Log Insight 8.x prior to 8.10.2.

Consequence: Successful exploitation of the vulnerability may allow remote code execution and complete system compromise.

Official announcement: For more information please refer to – https://www.vmware.com/security/advisories/VMSA-2023-0001.html

CVE-2023-20532 – See what’s going on with this vulnerability? (1st Feb 2023)

Preface: As usual when you read a vulnerability bulletin. The vendor sometimes do not disclose technical details to the public. If you will read daily renewal CVE records. Maybe you feel the same way I do. CPU is one of the key topics of the vulnerability database. Since the supplier has the right to secrecy. As a computer user, all you have to do is patch.

Background: AMD engineers that made the “Zen” architecture powering every AMD processor available today, from AMD Ryzen™ desktop and mobile processors, to AMD EPYC™ CPUs, and AMD Threadripper™ CPUs. It all started with “Zen”. AMD Epyc CPU codenames follow the naming scheme of Italian cities, including Milan (3rd Gen 2021), Rome (2nd Gen 2019) and Naples (1st Gen 2017).
The system management unit (SMU) is tasked with the job of continuously sampling sensory data and making rapid corrections to various circuits on the chip.
Ryzen SMU is a Linux kernel driver that exposes access to the SMU (System Management Unit) for certain AMD Ryzen Processors.

Vulnerability details: Insufficient input validation in the SMU may allow an attacker to improperly lock resources, potentially resulting in a denial of service.

Reference: Traditionally, There are two main types of kernel locks. The fundamental type is the spinlock (include/asm/spinlock[.]h). The second type is a mutex (include/linux/mutex[.]h): it is like a spinlock, but you may block holding a mutex.

For official announcement on AMD Server Vulnerabilities – January 2023. Please refer to url – https://www.amd.com/en/corporate/product-security/bulletin/amd-sb-1032

Remark: If you’re interested in the matter, see the diagram for details.

CVE-2023-0240 LINUX KERNEL until 5.10.160 IO_URING (IO_PREP_ASYNC_WORK) memory corruption  (30th Jan 2023)

Preface: The basic idea behind AIO is to allow a process to initiate a number of I/O operations without having to block or wait for any to complete.

Background: System calls are how a program enters the kernel to perform some task. Programs use system calls to perform a variety of operations such as: creating processes, doing network , file IO,…etc.
io_uring is an asynchronous I/O interface provided by Linux. The implementation of io_uring uses only three syscalls: io_uring_setup, io_uring_enter and io_uring_register.
io_uring gets its name from ring buffers which are shared between user space and kernel space.

There is a size limit of 1GiB per buffer. Currently, the buffers must be anonymous, non-file-backed memory, such as that returned by malloc(3) or mmap(2) with the MAP_ANONYMOUS flag set.
Do you think it is possible to launch a remote attack through this vulnerability (CVE-2023-0240)? Perhaps possible. It can exploit Kernel Driver mmap Handler Exploitation.

Ref: The use-after-free vulnerability exploits a mistake made by the original author of a software and can result in devastating effects that range from remote code execution to the leaking of sensitive data.

Vulnerability details: There is a logic error in io_uring’s implementation which can be used to trigger a use-after-free vulnerability leading to privilege escalation. In the io_prep_async_work function the assumption that the last io_grab_identity call cannot return false is not true, and in this case the function will use the init_cred or the previous linked requests identity to do operations instead of using the current identity. This can lead to reference counting issues causing use-after-free. We recommend upgrading past version 5.10.161.

Official announcement: For details, please refer to the URL – https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-0240

About CVE-2023-0394 (30th Jan 2023)

Preface: Believed that this design weakness already been fixed before CVE release to public. So do not worry about that.
To become secure, since a known Potential issues of IPv6 extension headers. Therefore , both stateful and stateless firewalls should do a deep inspection. Otherwise, it can do the evasion silently.

Background: From an early deployment aspect, IPv6 is seen as mandatory for specific 5G traffic flows, such as the 5G Control Plane (CP) and the 5G User Plane (UP). For the Management Plane (MP) and IPSec, IPv6 deployment in the early phase is not seen as mandatory but optional if available. But time will tell, IPv6 will have a major role to play in 5G, as IPv4 addresses, which are already in short supply, could never suffice the ever-growing connection demand further down the road.
IPv6 extension headers contains supplementary information used by network devices (such as routers, switches, and endpoint hosts) to decide how to direct or process an IPv6 packet. The length of each extension header is an integer multiple of 8 octets.

Vulnerability Details: A NULL pointer dereference flaw was found in rawv6_push_pending_frames in net/ipv6/raw.c in the network subcomponent in the Linux kernel. This flaw causes the system to crash.

Ref:In normal circumstances, Extension headers other than the Hop-by-Hop (HBH) options header are not processed, inserted, or removed by any node until the packet reaches the destination node, but this is a potential problem.

For the official announcement, please refer to the following URL: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-0394

Speculation – Cause of Microsoft Edge (Chromium-based) Vulnerabilities (25th Jan 2023)

Preface: Edge was initially built with Microsoft’s own proprietary browser engine, EdgeHTML, and their Chakra JavaScript engine. In late 2018, it was announced that Edge would be completely rebuilt as a Chromium-based browser with Blink and V8 engines.

The new Microsoft Edge is based on Chromium and was released on January 15, 2020. It is compatible with all supported versions of Windows, and macOS.

Background: In Chromium, a renderer doesn’t run in the main browser’s process. Different sites will run in different renderers who have different processes. Last year it found flaw occurred. CVE-2022-1134 – bug got remote code execution in Chrome renderer. The bug exists in the super inline cache (SuperIC) feature.

Blink is Google Chrome’s rendering engine , V8 is the JavaScript Engine used within Blink. Inline cache is an optimization used in V8 for speeding up property accesses in bytecode generated by Ignition (the interpreter in V8). 

Edge and Chrome are both built on the Chromium open-source browser using the Blink rendering engine

Vulnerability details:

CVE-2023-21796: Microsoft Edge (Chromium-based) Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability. This CVE ID is unique from CVE-2023-21795.

CVE-2023-21795: Microsoft Edge (Chromium-based) Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability. This CVE ID is unique from CVE-2023-21796.

CVE-2023-21775: Microsoft Edge (Chromium-based) Remote Code Execution Vulnerability

CVE-2023-21719: Microsoft Edge (Chromium-based) Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability

Official announcement: See URL for details – https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/DeployEdge/microsoft-edge-relnotes-security

Observation: Refer to CVE-2022-1134. A JavaScript object has its map as its first field. In V8, this field is used for determining the type of an object, so by putting the map of a double Array in our fake object, V8 will interpret it as a double array. So, code region overwritten.

Since no details release by vendor. But think it over, in Chromium, a renderer doesn’t run in the main browser’s process. Different sites will run in different renderers who have different processes. However if there is Remote Code Execution Vulnerability happened (similar CVE-2022-1134). Then the impact will be different.

The flaw display in diagram so called  type confusion vulnerability. When a memory buffer is accessed using the wrong type, it could read or write memory out of the bounds of the buffer, if the allocated buffer is smaller than the type that the code is attempting to access, leading to a crash and possibly code execution. Then Exploiting this flaw to get a Privileged Shell.

Oracle Critical Patch Update Advisory – January 2023 : Security Focus CVE-2022-2274 (17th JAN 2023)

Preface: Due to the threat posed by a successful attack, Oracle strongly recommends that customers apply Critical Patch Update security patches as soon possible.

Background: AVX-512 debuted in 2016 on Intel’s Xeon Phi x200 (codenamed Knights Landing). However, the instruction set has since found its way into other products from the chipmaker, such as Skylake-SP, Skylake-X, Cannon Lake, and Cascade Lake.
Furthermore, Intel’s support for AVX-512 instructions with its Alder Lake processors.
But an information disclosed by vendor to downstream manufacture that AVX-512 support on Alder Lake much like overclocking.
Remark: Overclocking is the action of increasing a component’s clock rate, running it at a higher speed than it was designed to run.

Oracle Essbase is a business analytics solution that uses a proven, flexible, best-in-class architecture for analysis, reporting, and collaboration. Oracle Essbase can be accessed on an intuitive web interface, or using Microsoft Office, for all of your analytic and business modeling needs, from multi-dimensional analysis to complex procedural business logic applied to your data.

Vulnerability details: The OpenSSL 3.0.4 release introduced a serious bug in the RSA implementation for X86_64 CPUs supporting the AVX512IFMA instructions. This issue makes the RSA implementation with 2048 bit private keys incorrect on such machines and memory corruption will happen during the computation. As a consequence of the memory corruption an attacker may be able to trigger a remote code execution on the machine performing the computation. SSL/TLS servers or other servers using 2048 bit RSA private keys running on machines supporting AVX512IFMA instructions of the X86_64 architecture are affected by this issue.

Observation: Fundamentally, OpenSSL will build a record from each call to SSL_write and the kernel. The improvement is that build buffer in front of OpenSSL and don’t make SSL_write calls with small amounts of data if it have more coming. If AVX512IFMA instructions of the X86_64 architecture cause memory corruption due to overclocking.
So the buffer in front of openssl may have way exploit by attacker.

Due to memory corruption, an attacker may be able to trigger remote code execution on the machine performing the computation. I speculate that there may be an opportunity to exploit code execution in a similar vulnerability CVE-2022-42475 (heap-based buffer overflow vulnerability).

Workaround (RedHat) – Disabling the AVX512IFMA instruction set extension can effectively mitigate this flaw:
export OPENSSL_ia32cap=:~0x200000

Official announcement (Oracle):  For  details please refer to link – https://www.oracle.com/security-alerts/cpujan2023.html

CVE-2022-47630 – See whether your android can skip this vulnerability? Perhaps it can. (16th Jan 2023)

Preface: Why configure Secure Boot? This type of hardware restriction protects the operating system from rootkits and other attacks that may not be detected by antivirus software.

Background: Secure Boot is the process where the operating system boot images and code are authenticated against the hardware before they are authorized to be used in the boot process. The hardware is pre-configured to authenticate code using trusted security credentials. ARM architectures are the most common electronic design in the world, even though x86 is more common in the server market. ARM architectures are used in almost all smartphone designs, as well as in other small mobile devices and laptops.

Arm is the CPU architecture used by all modern smartphones in the Android and Apple ecosystems.

Vulnerability details: Trusted Firmware-A through 2.8 has an out-of-bounds read in the X.509 parser for parsing boot certificates. This affects downstream use of get_ext and auth_nvctr. Attackers might be able to trigger dangerous read side effects or obtain sensitive information about microarchitectural state.

Additional Details – One of its designs is not affected by this vulnerability:

If the config like below:

“load_auth_image” invoke “load_auth_image_internal” – See the attached picture for details

If the platform uses a custom image parser instead of the certificate
parser, the bug in the certificate parser is obviously not relevant. The
bug in auth_nvctr() may be relevant, but only if the returned data is:

  • Taken from an untrusted source (meaning that it is read prior to
    authentication).
  • Not already checked to be a primitively-encoded ASN.1 tag.
    In particular, if the custom image parser implementation wraps a 32-bit integer in an ASN.1 INTEGER, it is not affected.

Official announcement : Official details, please refer to url – https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-47630

Security Focus (CVE-2023-0022) – This CVE is included in SAP’s first 2023 security update. (15th JAN 2023)

Preface: OLAP is all about BI and Big Data. Online analytical processing (OLAP) is an approach to formulate and answer multidimensional queries to large datasets.

Background: SAP have released a new statement of direction for SAP BusinessObjectsthat introduces a new version of the SAP BusinessObjects BI suite code named SAP BusinessObjects BI 2024, available on-premises and through managed cloud. SAP will provide clear use case migration paths for the components that they plan to end support of after 2027.

https://www.sap.com/documents/2020/03/908ee705-8a7d-0010-87a3-c30de2ffd8ff.html

Vulnerability details: A code injection flaw in the BusinessObjects Business Intelligence platform (CVSS score of 9.9).

SAP BusinessObjects Business Intelligence Analysis edition for OLAP allows an authenticated attacker to inject malicious code that can be executed by the application over the network. On successful exploitation, an attacker can perform operations that may completely compromise the application causing a high impact on the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the application.

What was that happen? In what way Does customer will trigger this vulnerability? As usual, vendor did not disclosed the details. But in case of similar design. Attacker will do the attack in this way. For details, please refer to diagram for reference.

Official Announcement: Please see the link for details of this official announcement

https://www.sap.com/documents/2022/02/fa865ea4-167e-0010-bca6-c68f7e60039b.html

Affected Products: SAP BusinessObjects Business Intelligence platform (Analysis edition for OLAP), Versions – 420, 430

CVE‑2022‑42271 Staying alert, Artificial intelligence world! (12th Jan 2023)

Preface: An “intelligent” computer uses AI to think like a human and perform tasks on its own. Machine learning is how a computer system develops its intelligence. One way to train a computer to mimic human reasoning is to use a neural network, which is a series of algorithms that are modeled after the human brain.

Quote: A GPU devotes more transistors to arithmetic logic than a CPU does to caching and flow control. As of 2022, the highest transistor count GPU is Nvidia’s H100, built on TSMC’s N4 process and totalling 80 billion MOSFETs.

Background: The Intelligent Platform Management Interface, or IPMI, is a standard for controlling intelligent devices that monitor a system. To use this, you need an interface to an IPMI controller in your system (called a Baseboard Management Controller – BMC) and management software that can use the IPMI system.

Under normal circumstance, you must pick ‘IPMI top-level message handler’ to use IPMI. The message handler does not provide any user-level interfaces. Kernel code (like the watchdog) can still use it. If you need access from userland, you need to select ‘Device interface for IPMI’ if you want access through a device driver.

The Linux IPMI driver is modular. This driver is for supporting a system that sits on an IPMB bus; it allows the interface to look like a normal IPMI interface. Sending system interface addressed messages to it will cause the message to go to the registered BMC on the system (default at IPMI address 0x20).

Vulnerability details: NVIDIA baseboard management controller (BMC) contains a vulnerability in the Intelligent Platform Management Interface (IPMI) handler, where an attacker with the required privileges can cause a buffer overflow, which may lead to denial of service or code execution.

Official announcement: For official details see the link – https://nvidia.custhelp.com/app/answers/detail/a_id/5435

NVIDIA recommends that customers follow best security practices for BMC management (IPMIport). These include, but are not limited to, such measures as:

  • Restricting the DGX A100 IPMI port to an isolated, dedicated management network.
  • Using a separate, firewalled subnet.
  • Configuring a separate VLAN for BMC traffic if a dedicated network is not available.

Intel security advisory (AV23-015) 10th JAN 2023

Preface: OpenMP (Open Multi-Processing) is an application programming interface (API) that supports multi-platform shared-memory multiprocessing programming in C, C++, and Fortran, on many platforms, instruction-set architectures and operating systems, including Solaris, AIX, FreeBSD, HP-UX, Linux, macOS, and Windows.

Background: A LEGO brick is a small plastic part, but it can build a big robot. Similar concept, CPU manufacturers provide main components, guidelines as upstream product suppliers. Let computer hardware manufacturers build their own powerful supercomputers. So they use their own design for load sharing, offloading resources to the GPU. That’s how the tech world works right now.

We often hear that computer hardware has backdoors. It usually happens during the design phase of the hardware. If you ask, who will bear this burden, the downstream hardware developer or the upstream CPU manufacturer? My comment is two-sided (see below).

  • If the hardware developer does not follow the best practices recommended by the CPU manufacturer. Risks will happen.
  • If CPU and development tool manufacturers have design flaws. The risk will be on this side.

Vulnerability details: CVE-2022-40196

Description: Improper access control in the Intel(R) oneAPI DPC++/C++ Compiler before version 2022.2.1 for some Intel(R) oneAPI Toolkits before version 2022.3.1 may allow an authenticated user to potentially enable escalation of privilege via local access.

For details, see the link – https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/security-center/advisory/intel-sa-00773.html

My observation: As usual, the vendor does not reveal the root cause. See whether it can dig out part of the possibility.

For example: Unified Shared Memory (USM): Device Kernels can access the data using pointers. Like this programming example. The memcpy operation will wait on events e1 and e2 and Transfers data back from device to host memory. As we know, the memcpy() and memmove() functions are a source of buffer overflow vulnerabilities. Will Intel oneAPI DPC++/C++ Compiler encounter a vulnerability in this place?