Preface: Since the software device will be customized by the manufacturer. So-called OS and even web server hardening will be done by the manufacturer. If the web server and SQL packages contain design flaws (so-called multiple vulnerabilities). Sometimes there is no workaround. Need to be patched. But manufacturers of cyber defense utilities were quick to react. Their product design weaknesses will be fixed immediately.

Background: By w3techs.com statistics, Apache is used by 31.4% of all the websites whose web server we know. What is SonicWall Global Management System?

SonicWall Global Management System (GMS) solves these challenges. GMS integrates management and monitoring, analytics, forensics and audit reporting. This forms the foundation of a security governance, compliance and risk management strategy.

Security Focus: CVE-2023-34124 – The authentication mechanism in SonicWall GMS and Analytics Web Services had insufficient checks, allowing authentication bypass.

Tomcat become web server of GMS/Analyze by design. It can straight seen as administrator front end console/dashboard. When vulnerabilities occurs in Tomcat. It is hard to avoid burden the downstream services.

The manufacturer did not specify. See if it can find the root cause.

Perhaps multiple vulnerabilities on Tomcat/Apache burden Sonicwall GMS/Analyze!

Below is my observation:

A vulnerability in the JNDI Realm of Apache Tomcat allows an attacker to authenticate using variations of a valid user name and/or to bypass some of the protection provided by the LockOut Realm.

I believe the manufacturer is very concerned about this place. If the client code calls HttpServletRequest#logout(), it is delegated to getContext().getAuthenticator().logout(this); but AuthenticatorBase#logout(Request) never calls TomcatPrincipal#logout() to free resources.

Vulnerability details: SonicWall has identified four critical vulnerabilities (CVE-2023-34124, CVE-2023-34133, CVE-2023-34134, and CVE-2023-34137) that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to bypass authentication and potentially access Sensitive information on vulnerable websites. An on-prem system running GMS 9.3.2-SP1 or earlier and Analytics 2.5.0.4-R7 or earlier.

Official announcement: For details, please refer to the link – https://www.sonicwall.com/support/notices/urgent-security-notice-sonicwall-gms-analytics-impacted-by-suite-of-vulnerabilities/230710150218060/

Preface: Enable/Disable AMD virtualization in BIOS

1. Open BIOS menu.
2. Go to Advanced- > IOMMU and enable/disable AMD IOMMU. B. AMD SVM.
3. Go to Advanced -> SVM Mode and enable/disable AMD SVM.

Background: AMD-V technology added VM capability via VM instructions in AMD’s x86 CPU chips. The technology uses hardware to simplify the tasks that VM managers normally perform via software emulation.

Prior to starting an encrypted VM, software must enable MemEncryptionModEn through MSR C001_0010 (SYSCFG). SEV may then be enabled on a specific virtual machine during the VMRUN instruction if the hypervisor sets the SEV enable (bit 1) in VMCB offset 090h.

Vulnerability details: A potential power side-channel vulnerability in some AMD processors may allow an authenticated attacker to use the power reporting functionality to monitor a program’s execution inside an AMD SEV VM potentially resulting in a leak of sensitive information.

This attack exploit by attacker does not seem to be a particularly novel attack as it uses the same technique as the Platypus attack from 2020. One difference from the Platypus attack is this reported attack is used against an AMD SEV virtual machine.

2022-10-27 CVE assigned

2023-07-11 +257 days Released to public

Official announcement: For details, please refer to the links:

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-20575

https://www.amd.com/en/resources/product-security/bulletin/amd-sb-3004.html

Preface: If you recall, programming in Java was involved in the field of network security ten years ago, because many serious incidents were caused by Java applications. Over time, the Java sandbox and secure programming techniques temporarily calmed the field. However, there was no long-term peace.

Background: vm2 is a sandbox that can run untrusted code with whitelisted Node’s built-in modules. It specialized JavaScript sandbox used by a broad range of software tools for running and testing untrusted code in an isolated environment, preventing the code from accessing the host’s system resources or external data.

Vulnerability details: The library contains critical security issues and should not be used for production. The maintenance of the project has been discontinued. In vm2 for versions up to 3.9.19, Promise handler sanitization can be bypassed with @@species accessor property allowing attackers to escape the sandbox and run arbitrary code. Remote Code Execution, assuming the attacker has arbitrary code execution primitive inside the context of vm2 sandbox.

Ref: A Node[.]js Promise is a placeholder for a value that will be available in the future, allowing us to handle the result of an asynchronous task once it has completed or encountered an error. Promises make writing asynchronous code easier. They’re an improvement on the callback pattern and very popular in Node[.]js.

Ref: The Proxy object allows you to create an object that can be used in place of the original object, but which may redefine fundamental Object operations like getting, setting, and defining properties. Proxy objects are commonly used to log property accesses, validate, format, or sanitize inputs, and so on.

Official announcement: For details, please refer to the link – https://www.tenable.com/cve/CVE-2023-37466

Preface: Security profiles in proxy mode can perform SSL inspection on HTTP/2 traffic that is secured by TLS 1.2 or 1.3 using the Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation (ALPN) extension.

Background: In HTTP/2, a series of “pseudo-headers” is used to send key information about the message. Most notably, several pseudo-headers effectively replace the HTTP/1 request line and status line. In total, there are five pseudo-headers: :method – The HTTP method of the request, such as GET or POST .
Deep packet inspection evaluates the data part and the header of a packet that is transmitted through an inspection point, weeding out any non-compliance to protocol, spam, viruses, intrusions, and any other defined criteria to block the packet from passing through the inspection point.
Security profiles in proxy mode can perform SSL inspection on HTTP/2 traffic that is secured by TLS 1.2 or 1.3 using the Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation (ALPN) extension.

Vulnerability details: A stack-based overflow vulnerability [CWE-124] in FortiOS & FortiProxy may allow a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code or command via crafted packets reaching proxy policies or firewall policies with proxy mode alongside SSL deep packet inspection.

Ref: When using TLS, most clients default to HTTP/1 and explicitly advertise support for HTTP/2 via the ALPN field during the web server TLS handshake. Some web servers that support HTTP/2 are misconfigured to advertise this fact, causing clients to only communicate with them HTTP/1, and hiding the potential attack surface. Attacker takes HTTP/1.1-formatted requests as input, then rewrites them as HTTP/2. During the rewrite, it performs a few character mappings on the headers to override pseudo-headers by specifying them as fake HTTP/1.1 headers.

Official announcement: For details, please refer to the link – https://www.fortiguard.com/psirt/FG-IR-23-183

Preface: The secure access solution from Citrix provides a unified stack of cloud-delivered services that allows IT to provide a productive hybrid work environment with zero trust security.

Background: Citrix Secure Access client for Linux is a VPN client software managed by NetScaler Gateway that enables users to access corporate data and applications remotely. It protects applications from unauthorized access, application-level threats, and browser-based attacks.
Ref: If the HttpOnly attribute is set on a cookie, then the cookie’s value cannot be read or set by client side JavaScript. This measure makes certain client side attacks, such as cross-site scripting, slightly harder to exploit by preventing them from trivially capturing the cookie’s value via an injected script.

Vulnerability details: Vulnerabilities have been discovered in Citrix Secure Access client for Ubuntu (previously Citrix Gateway VPN client for Ubuntu). 
If exploited, could allow an attacker to remotely execute code if a victim user opens an attacker-crafted link and accepts further prompts.
The following supported versions are affected by the vulnerability: Versions before 23.5.2
Ref: The Citrix Secure Access and Citrix EPA clients support the HTTPOnly flag on the  authentication cookies.
NetScaler Gateway admins configure the HTTPOnly feature on the authentication cookie that are generated by web applications. This feature help in preventing cookie theft due to cross site scripting .

Official announcement:For details, please refer to the link – https://support.citrix.com/article/CTX564169/citrix-secure-access-client-for-ubuntu-security-bulletin-for-cve202324492

Preface: Android Ril The RIL part of Android is mainly divided into two parts: RILJ and RILC. RILJ runs in the java part of framework->telephony, and RILC runs in the native part of the HAL layer.

Background: The AP side of different manufacturers of the Android platform can be the same, but the Modem side will definitely be very different. One problem that the RIL layer needs to solve is to adapt to the Modem of different manufacturers. In order to meet the compatibility requirements, Android builds a In the framework of RILC, different Modem manufacturers connect their own protocols to the AP side. For the Qualcomm platform, his RILC is QCRIL.

Vulnerability details: Memory Corruption in Linux while processing QcRilRequestImsRegisterMultiIdentityMessage request.

Official announcement: For details, please refer to the link – https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-21633

Preface: Gunyah is a Type-1 hypervisor designed for strong security, performance and modularity. Independent of any high-level OS kernel, Gunyah runs in a higher CPU privilege level, and does not depend on any lower-privileged OS kernel/code for its core functionality.

Background: Gunyah is a product of Qualcomm Innovation Center, Inc. Gunyah is an open-source type-1 hypervisor developed by Qualcomm with an emphasis on security and other features.
There are 2 types of process:

• Independent Processes – Processes that do not share data with other processes.
• Cooperating Processes – Processes that shares data with other processes.
  Inter-Process Communication is the mechanism by which cooperating process share data and information.
• Shared memory: A particular region of memory is shared between cooperating process.
• Cooperating process can exchange information by reading and writing data to this shared region.
• It’s faster than Memory Parsing, as Kernel is required only once, that is, setting up a shared memory . After That, kernel assistance is not required.

Vulnerability details: Arbitrary memory overwrite when VM gets compromised in TX write leading to Memory Corruption.

Official announcement: For details, please refer to the link – https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-22387