Category Archives: Potential Risk of CVE

About 3rd part design weakness impact Intel® Xeon® 6 Processors with P-cores with Intel® TDX Connect (29-12-2025)

Last revised: 12/09/2025

Preface: Intel’s Xeon 6 processors represent a fascinating shift in the landscape of data center computing, moving toward a hybrid architecture that optimizes for different workloads with specialized cores. The P-core version, codenamed Granite Rapids, built entirely of Performance-cores for heavy compute and AI workloads, is accurate and highlights a significant technological leap in server processing capabilities. This new generation aims to deliver unprecedented performance and efficiency to meet the increasing demands of modern data centers, which are grappling with massive data volumes and the computational intensity of artificial intelligence.

Background: Intel® TDX Connect is specifically highlighted as a key feature on Intel® Xeon® 6 Processors with P-cores (Performance-cores) to enable confidential computing for connected devices like GPUs. Intel’s P6 architecture, as part of modern high-speed systems using PCI Express (PCIe), relies on SERDES (Serializer/Deserializer) technology, especially for PCIe 3.0 and newer, to handle high data rates through serial links, though P6 itself refers to older processor generations, the concept of using SERDES for high-speed I/O like PCIe is fundamental, with newer Intel CPUs using advanced SerDes for PCIe 4.0, 5.0, and 6.0 to achieve massive bandwidth for AI and data centers.

Does the Intel P6 use PCIe SERDES?

Yes, Intel’s P6 architecture, as part of modern high-speed systems using PCI Express (PCIe), relies on SERDES (Serializer/Deserializer) technology, especially for PCIe 3.0 and newer, to handle high data rates through serial links, though P6 itself refers to older processor generations, the concept of using SERDES for high-speed I/O like PCIe is fundamental, with newer Intel CPUs using advanced SerDes for PCIe 4.0, 5.0, and 6.0 to achieve massive bandwidth for AI and data centers.

Vulnerability details: [CVE-2025-9612] Improper validation of integrity check value in PCI Port for some Intel® platforms with Integrity and Data Encryption (IDE) for PCIe Base Specification Revision 5 or higher within Ring 0: Bare Metal OS may allow an information disclosure and escalation of privilege. System software adversary with a privileged user combined with a high complexity attack may enable escalation of privilege. This result may potentially occur via local access when attack requirements are present without special internal knowledge and requires no user interaction. The potential vulnerability may impact the confidentiality (low), integrity (low) and availability (none) of the vulnerable system, resulting in subsequent system confidentiality (none), integrity (none) and availability (none) impacts.

Official announcement: Please refer to the link for details –

https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/security-center/advisory/intel-sa-01409.html

CVE-2025-33223: NVIDIA Isaac Launchable contains a vulnerability (29th Dec 2025)

Official Updated 12/22/2025 09:21 AM

Preface: The ability to launch NVIDIA Isaac Lab via NVIDIA Brev (Cloud) is fundamentally driven by the need to democratize access to high-performance robotics simulation and AI development environments, circumventing significant hardware and setup barriers. This collaboration between Isaac Lab and Brev offers a streamlined, low-friction pathway for developers and researchers to leverage powerful, preconfigured GPU resources in the cloud.

Background: Isaac Lab requires a compatible version of Isaac Sim to run. An “Isaac Lab Launchable” is an installation option, such as via NVIDIA Brev (Cloud), to quickly get the environment running. The Launchable provides the correct Isaac Sim/Python setup, but you still use env_config[.]yaml within your scripts to define what runs on that platform.

In essence, Issac Lab use env_config[.]yaml to specify tasks (like Isaac-Ant-v0) within your Python training scripts (e.g., train[.]py)The environment command

isaaclab/scripts/reinforcement_learning/skrl/train[.]py –task=Isaac-Ant-v0 specifically targets the Isaac-Ant-v0 task. If train[.]py or related scripts dynamically construct shell commands from these inputs without validation, that’s a classic command injection risk.

Vulnerability details: CVE-2025-33223 – NVIDIA Isaac Launchable contains a vulnerability where an attacker could cause an execution with unnecessary privileges. A successful exploit of this vulnerability might lead to code execution, escalation of privileges, denial of service, information disclosure and data tampering.

Official announcement: Please refer to the link for details –

https://nvidia.custhelp.com/app/answers/detail/a_id/5749

CVE-2025-33226: NVIDIA NeMo Framework for all platforms contains a vulnerability (24th Dec 2025)

Official Updated 12/12/2025 02:17 PM

Preface: NVIDIA NeMo is a versatile, end-to-end platform used across a vast spectrum of industries, primarily to build, customize, and deploy generative AI agents and applications, such as custom chatbots and specialized assistants. Its primary users are companies in the computer software industry, but its use cases span many different sectors, including energy, telecommunications, financial services, healthcare, and retail.

NeMo is the framework for building models, while NIM (NVIDIA Inference Microservices) provides pre-packaged tools to easily deploy and manage those (and other) AI models as APIs, with NIM often using NeMo’s customized models for inference, creating a unified ecosystem.

Background: Uploading model checkpoints from the NVIDIA NeMo framework to NVIDIA NIM is essential for streamlining the transition from model development and training to optimized, scalable, production-ready inference. This integration merges the development power of NeMo with the robust, deployment-focused capabilities of NIM.

The process is more than a simple file transfer; it is a critical step in a comprehensive, end-to-end AI lifecycle management strategy. NVIDIA NeMo is a powerful framework for building, training, and fine-tuning large language models (LLMs) and other generative AI models, producing specialized .nemo checkpoints that contain model configurations and weights. NVIDIA NIM, or NVIDIA Inference Microservices, then takes these trained, domain-specific models and packages them into prebuilt, optimized, and secure microservices for deployment across various environments, whether in the cloud, on-premises data centers, or at the edge.

The restore_from() method is a function used for model loading and restoration. It allows you to: 

  • Load a previously trained model instance, including its weights and configuration, from a saved .nemo file.
  • Resume training from a specific point or perform fine-tuning/inference with a pre-trained model

Vulnerability details: CVE-2025-33226: NVIDIA NeMo Framework for all platforms contains a vulnerability where malicious data created by an attacker may cause a code injection. A successful exploit of this vulnerability may lead to code execution, escalation of privileges, information disclosure, and data tampering.

Official announcement: Please refer to the link for details – https://nvidia.custhelp.com/app/answers/detail/a_id/5736

CVE-2025-33235 is specifically about a vulnerability in NVIDIA’s implementation, not PyTorch or NVRx directly (23rd Dec 2025)

Official Updated 12/12/2025 02:20 PM

Preface: Given Google’s efforts to make its hardware compatible with PyTorch, why is the NVIDIA Resiliency Extension (NVRx) still needed? The answer lies in the complementarity of these technologies, the realities of large-scale distributed systems, and the practical necessity to ensure training efficiency and fault tolerance, especially when using NVIDIA GPUs, which remain the mainstream platform for AI development. While Google is working to make its Tensor Processing Units (TPUs) more compatible with PyTorch to provide an alternative, the NVIDIA Resiliency Extension aims to address the specific and pressing challenges encountered when performing large-scale distributed PyTorch training on NVIDIA’s widely used hardware, such as hardware on cloud platforms like Google Cloud.

Background: The open-source machine learning framework PyTorch was originally developed by researchers at Facebook AI Research (now Meta AI). It was first publicly released in September 2016. PyTorch-based workloads are artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) tasks and applications that are developed, trained, and run using the PyTorch open-source deep learning framework.

The NVIDIA Resiliency Extension (NVRx) integrates multiple resiliency-focused solutions for PyTorch-based workloads. Users can modularly integrate NVRx capabilities into their own infrastructure to maximize AI training productivity at scale. The NVIDIA Resiliency Extension (NVRx) is a specific Python package that integrates several solutions to minimize downtime and maximize the effective training time for PyTorch-based workloads running on NVIDIA infrastructure. NVRx is a Python package that framework developers and users can modularly integrate into their own infrastructure. It is used in major NVIDIA frameworks like the NVIDIA NeMo Framework for building large language models, providing the underlying machinery for their resilient training capabilities.

NVRx provides utilities that run the actual checkpoint saving routines in the background. It employs mechanisms, often leveraging torch.multiprocessing, to fork a separate, temporary process dedicated to handling the I/O operations after the data has been quickly staged from GPU memory to CPU buffers.

Vulnerability details: CVE-2025-33235 – NVIDIA Resiliency Extension for Linux contains a vulnerability in the checkpointing core, where an attacker may cause a race condition. A successful exploit of this vulnerability may lead to information disclosure, data tampering, denial of service, or escalation of privileges.

Official announcement: Please refer to the link for details – https://nvidia.custhelp.com/app/answers/detail/a_id/5746

About CVE-2025-32210: NVIDIA Isaac Lab, a story can tell! (22-12-2025)

Official Updated 12/12/2025 02:19 PM

Preface: The primary difficulties in robotics learning involve bridging the gap between simulation and reality (the “reality gap”), enabling robust perception and decision-making in unpredictable environments, handling complex physical interactions like contact dynamics, ensuring safety and security, addressing high costs and lack of standardization, and overcoming workforce skill gaps, all while managing computational and power limitations.

Background: Isaac Lab uses NVIDIA Isaac Sim’s capabilities for realistic virtual environments, allowing researchers to train complex robot behaviors efficiently through parallel simulation and data generation, then transfer these policies to physical robots. The primary difficulties Isaac Lab tackles are:

While the physical world remains the definitive testbed, the acquisition of physical interaction data with robots is expensive, time-consuming, and often necessitates specialized instrumentation. These limitations are especially acute in rare but safety-critical situations. Events such as high-speed collisions, hardware malfunctions, or navigation in unpredictable human environments are difficult to reproduce and pose significant risks to equipment and human safety.

NVIDIA Isaac Sim manages computational and power limitations through GPU-accelerated design, customizable performance settings, and scalable deployment options, allowing users to balance performance, fidelity, and resource consumption. This approach empowers developers to tailor the simulation environment to their specific hardware capabilities and project needs, from local workstations to cloud-based multi-GPU setups.

Key contributions of Isaac Lab

• Modular and scalable framework: Built on NVIDIA Omniverse, enabling high-fidelity, GPU-accelerated simulation for complex robots and tasks.

• Advanced sensor simulation: Supports tiled RTX rendering, Warp-based custom sensors, and physics-based data for rich observation spaces.

• Seamless teleoperation and data collection: Integrates spacemouse, VR headsets, and other devices for large-scale demonstration capture.

• Extensive environment suite: Provides diverse, ready-to-use environments for reinforcement learning, imitation learning, and sim-to-real research.

Vulnerability details: CVE-2025-32210 – NVIDIA Isaac Lab contains a deserialization vulnerability.  A successful exploit of this vulnerability might lead to code execution.

Official announcement: Please refer to the link for details – https://nvidia.custhelp.com/app/answers/detail/a_id/5733

CVE-2025-48507: Incorrect Secure Flag Usage in Versal™ Adaptive SoC Arm® Trusted Firmware (19th Dec 2025)

Revision Date : 2025-Dec-17

Preface: AMD removed “Arm” from “Arm Trusted Firmware” (TF-A) references in their documentation (like for their EPYC/ Ryzen CPUs) to signify that while it’s based on Arm’s open standard, their implementation is tailored for AMD hardware, making it AMD’s own secure boot/firmware solution, not just Arm’s code, promoting clearer branding and ownership for their specific silicon, even though it adheres to Arm’s secure architecture principles.

Background: General-purpose Versal™ adaptive SoCs combine programmable logic with embedded Arm® application and real-time CPU cores, a programmable network on chip, high-speed serial transceivers, programmable I/O, and a broad offering of hard IP.

As various operating systems from various different vendors can be present in an ARM system, performing power control requires a method of collaboration. Considering operation in Non-secure state, if a supervisory system that is managing power, whether it is executing at the OS level (EL1) or at hypervisor level (EL2), wants to enter an idle state, power up or power down a core, or reset or shut down the system, supervisory systems at other Exception levels will need to react to the power state change request.

“Secure” (as a flag/designation): This refers to the privilege level the request claims to have been initiated from. When a request, like a Power State Coordination Interface (PSCI) command, is marked as “secure,” it is asking to be treated as though it originated from the trusted Secure World, with full access rights to all system resources.

“Processor’s actual security state”: This refers to the physical, hardware-enforced execution state the CPU is currently operating in (either Non-Secure World or Secure World). The physical state determines which memory regions and peripherals the code can genuinely access.

Vulnerability details: The Secure Flag passed to VersalTM Adaptive SoC’s Trusted Firmware for Cortex®-A processors (TF-A) for Arm’s Power State Coordination Interface (PSCI) commands were incorrectly set to secure instead of using the processor’s actual security state. This would allow the PSCI requests to appear they were from processors in the secure state instead of the non-secure state.

The vulnerability affects Versal™ Adaptive SoC’s Arm® Trusted Firmware (TF-A) for Cortex-A processors.

Root cause: The Secure Flag passed to PSCI (Power State Coordination Interface) commands was incorrectly set to secure instead of reflecting the processor’s actual security state.

Impact: This misconfiguration allows PSCI requests from a non-secure processor to appear as if they originate from a secure state, potentially enabling unauthorized access or manipulation of secure resources.

Severity: CVSS v4.0 score is 1.0 (Low), but it compromises the integrity of the security model.

Official announcement: Please refer to the link for details.

https://www.amd.com/en/resources/product-security/bulletin/amd-sb-8020.html

Android Security Bulletin—December 2025

CVE-2025-48633- Improper use of Binder identity manipulation in system code (18th Dec 2025)

Official announcement:  December 1, 2025 | Updated December 4, 2025

Preface: The improper use of Binder identity manipulation in Android system code refers to a class of security vulnerabilities where a malicious application or process can spoof its identity (specifically its User ID and Process ID) when communicating with a trusted system service via the Binder Inter-Process Communication (IPC) mechanism. This deception can allow a lower-privileged application to bypass security checks and execute sensitive operations with the privileges of a legitimate, trusted system process

Before the remedy – The code iterated through each user profile and created a context for that user. It then called AccountManager.getAccounts() for that specific user context. This means the check was per-user, and the caller only saw accounts for the user context it created. However, because the code temporarily cleared the Binder identity (Binder.clearCallingIdentity()), it was operating with system-level privileges during that loop. If misused, this could allow a component to access accounts across users, which is a privilege escalation risk.

What was the vulnerability?

The issue was in the Android system code that checked whether any accounts existed on the device. Please refer to the attached diagram for details.

Official announcement: For more details, please refer to the following link – https://source.android.com/docs/security/bulletin/2025-12-01

Do PCIe IOCTL and SERDES pose a risk to Google Ironwood TPU? (15th Dec 2025)

My originally scheduled for release on December 17, 2025, it was released ahead of schedule!

Preface: PCIe is one protocol used to transfer data across the SerDes. Different protocols can be used to transfer data across the SerDes.

SerDes (Serializer/Deserializer) in PCIe Gen 5 and Gen 2 are critical physical layer components that handle high-speed data conversion, but Gen 5 operates at a massive 32 GT/s per lane, doubling Gen 2’s 5 GT/s, requiring advanced signal integrity (like DSP, error correction) and sophisticated retimers to manage vastly higher frequencies (32 GHz vs. 5 GHz), while maintaining backward compatibility for seamless integration, crucial for modern AI/ML and data-intensive applications

Background: Recent AMD advisories (CVE-2025-9612/9613/9614) highlight vulnerabilities in PCIe Integrity and Data Encryption (IDE) and IOCTL-based SERDES control. These flaws allow attackers with low-level or physical access to manipulate PCIe traffic or exploit driver logic, potentially leading to:

  • Data Integrity Violations
  • Privilege Escalation
  • Denial of Service (DoS)

Google’s Ironwood TPU architecture uses PCIe Gen5 (host) and Gen2 (gBMC) links, both relying on SERDES for high-speed signaling. If TPU drivers expose IOCTL interfaces for SERDES configuration without strict validation, similar risks apply:

  • Direct Hardware Access: IOCTLs can alter PLL settings, lane equalization, and data rates.
  • Privilege Escalation: Weak access control could let non-root processes manipulate SERDES.
  • Kernel Attack Surface: Complex IOCTL handlers may enable buffer overflow or arbitrary code execution.

Impact on Cloud TPU Deployments: Ironwood’s scale—9,216 chips per pod, 1.77 PB shared memory, and 9.6 Tb/s interconnect bandwidth—amplifies the consequences of link instability or compromised isolation. Multi-tenant environments increase exposure to insider or advanced persistent threats.

Recommended Mitigations

Restrict IOCTL Access: Enforce root-only privileges for SERDES configuration commands.

Implement capability checks for sensitive operations (e.g., SERDES_SET_DATA_RATE).

Validate Input Parameters: Ensure strict bounds on PLL, lane equalization, and data rate settings.

Apply PCIe IDE Erratum #1 Guidance: Update firmware to address IDE vulnerabilities per PCI-SIG recommendations.

Enable Hardware Security Features: Use IOMMU and Zero-Trust principles for PCIe endpoints.

Continuous Monitoring: Deploy anomaly detection for PCIe link training and SERDES state changes.

– End of article –

About: CVE-2025-33214 – NVIDIA NVTabular for Linux and CVE-2025-33213 – NVIDIA Merlin Transformers4Rec for Linux (15th Dec 2025)

Preface: Suppose you’re using cuML’s model persistence feature to load a serialized model from disk or a remote source. If the source is not trusted or validated, and the deserialization uses pickle or similar unsafe methods, it could execute arbitrary code.

The attached diagram demonstrates arbitrary code execution via pickle, which aligns with CVE-2025-33214 and likely CVE-2025-33213 if input validation is missing.

Background: NVTabular is a component of NVIDIA Merlin, an open source framework for building and deploying recommender systems and works with the other Merlin components including Merlin Models, HugeCTR and Merlin Systems to provide end-to-end acceleration of recommender systems on the GPU.

NVTabular requires Python version 3.7+. Additionally, GPU support requires:

  • CUDA version 11.0+
  • NVIDIA Pascal GPU or later (Compute Capability >=6.0)
  • NVIDIA driver 450.80.02+
  • Linux or WSL

When running NVTabular on the Criteo 1TB Click Logs Dataset using a single V100 32GB GPU, feature engineering and preprocessing was able to be completed in 13 minutes. Furthermore, when running NVTabular on a DGX-1 cluster with eight V100 GPUs, feature engineering and preprocessing was able to be completed within three minutes. Combined with HugeCTR, the dataset can be processed and a full model can be trained in only six minutes.

NVIDIA Merlin™ accelerates the entire pipeline, from ingesting and training to deploying GPU-accelerated recommender systems. Merlin NVTabular is a feature engineering and preprocessing library designed to effectively manipulate terabytes of recommender system datasets and significantly reduce data preparation time. It provides efficient feature transformations, preprocessing, and high-level abstraction that accelerates computation on GPUs using the RAPIDS™ cuDF library.

Vulnerability details:

CVE-2025-33214 – NVIDIA NVTabular for Linux contains a vulnerability in the Workflow component, where a user could cause a deserialization issue. A successful exploit of this vulnerability might lead to code execution, denial of service, information disclosure, and data tampering.

CVE-2025-33213 – NVIDIA Merlin Transformers4Rec for Linux contains a vulnerability in the Trainer component where a user may cause a deserialization issue. A successful exploit of this vulnerability may lead to code execution, denial of service, information disclosure, and data tampering.

Official announcement: Please refer to the following link for details-

https://nvidia.custhelp.com/app/answers/detail/a_id/5739

CVE-2025-14372: Use after free in Password Manager.

My originally scheduled for release on December 15, 2025, it was released ahead of schedule!

Stable Channel Update for Desktop – Wednesday, December 10, 2025

Preface: About Google browser (The Storage Architecture): A Database, Not Just a Flat File . Chrome stores login data, including usernames, the website URL, and the encrypted password, in a local SQLite database file named Login Data. This is a structured database, not just a raw file opened and read with basic I/O or mmap() for the specific password fields.

Background: Chrome browser temporarily holds decrypted passwords in memory for a short duration when the user is actively logged in and using the browser. This design choice is fundamental to the “autofill” functionality and allows for a seamless login experience, but it introduces a specific, nuanced security consideration.

When a user visits a website and Chrome needs to autofill credentials, or when the user views their passwords in the settings, the necessary data is retrieved from the encrypted database and decrypted in memory only for that specific, immediate use.

Important: The Necessity of In-Memory Decryption

The core of your query lies in the operational phase. When you visit a website that requires a login, Chrome must retrieve the stored, encrypted password, decrypt it using the relevant OS-level key, and then inject the actual plaintext password into the login form for the autofill feature to work.

Vulnerability details: (CVE-2025-14372) Use after free in Password Manager.

Key points related to this design flaw:

  • Structured Storage: Chrome uses a SQLite database (Login Data) for credentials, not a flat file. This means any memory-related flaw could impact query execution rather than raw file reads.
  • Multi-Layered Decryption: Chrome leverages OS-level APIs (e.g., DPAPI on Windows, Keychain on macOS) for decrypting passwords, so the vulnerability likely affects intermediate steps rather than the final decryption logic.
  • SQLite Vulnerability: The aggregate term overflow issue is real and could lead to memory corruption if Chrome’s query patterns trigger it.

Official announcement: Please refer to the link for details –

https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/2025/12/stable-channel-update-for-desktop_10.html