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AI and ML, Potential Risk of CVE

CVE-2025-53818: Command Injection in MCP Server github-kanban-mcp-server (15th July 2025)

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Preface: Does it good when artificial Intelligence use Open Source software? Yes, using open-source software is generally considered a positive aspect for artificial intelligence development. It fosters collaboration, transparency, and faster innovation, while also potentially reducing costs and biases. However, it’s crucial to acknowledge potential risks like misuse and the need for responsible development practices.

Background: The Model Context Protocol (MCP) is an open standard, open-source framework designed to standardize how AI models, particularly large language models (LLMs), interact with external tools, systems, and data sources. Think of it as a universal adapter, similar to USB-C, for AI applications, allowing them to easily connect to and utilize various data and tools.

A Kanban MCP Server is a server component that manages Kanban boards using the Model Context Protocol (MCP). It allows AI assistants and other systems to interact with and manipulate Kanban boards programmatically, enabling automation and integration of workflows.

Vulnerability details: GitHub Kanban MCP Server is a Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for managing GitHub issues in Kanban board format and streamlining LLM task management. Versions 0.3.0 and 0.4.0 of the MCP Server are written in a way that is vulnerable to command injection vulnerability attacks as part of some of its MCP Server tool definition and implementation. The MCP Server exposes the tool `add_comment` which relies on Node.js child process API `exec` to execute the GitHub (`gh`) command, is an unsafe and vulnerable API if concatenated with untrusted user input.

Workaround: As of time of publication, no known patches are available.

But you can securely rewrite the vulnerable handleAddComment function using execFile or the GitHub REST API to avoid command injection risks.

Workaround 1: Using execFile (Safer Shell Execution)

execFile does not invoke a shell, so special characters in inputs (like ;, &&, etc.) are treated as literal arguments, not commands

Workaround 2: Using GitHub REST API via @octokit/rest

– No shell involved.

– Fully typed and authenticated.

– GitHub officially supports and maintains this SDK.

Official announcement: Please refer to url for details –

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-53818

AI and ML

AMD-based AI systems combining AMD rocBLAS and Intel MKL can become fast supercomputer in the world (14-07-2025)

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Preface: Supercomputers rely on math libraries to efficiently handle the complex numerical computations required for scientific simulations and modeling. These libraries provide optimized routines for linear algebra, numerical analysis, and other mathematical operations, enabling supercomputers to perform these calculations much faster than with general-purpose code.

While math libraries are a crucial component, they are not the sole key to boosting overall AI performance on supercomputers. Supercomputers excel at AI due to their parallel processing capabilities, specialized hardware like GPUs and TPUs, and efficient memory management, not just the math libraries they use. Math libraries are essential for performing the calculations required by AI algorithms, but they rely on the underlying hardware architecture and software infrastructure of the supercomputer to deliver that performance.

Background: AMD rocBLAS 6.0.2 is a version of AMD’s library for Basic Linear Algebra Subprograms (BLAS) optimized for AMD GPUs within the ROCm platform. It provides high-performance, robust implementations of BLAS operations, similar to legacy BLAS but adapted for GPU execution using the HIP programming language. Specifically, version 6.0.2 is a point release that includes minor bug fixes to improve the stability of applications using AMD’s MI300 GPUs. It also introduces new driver features for system qualification on partner server offerings.

Using AMD rocBLAS and Intel MKL (2016 or later) together can be beneficial because MKL, while optimized for Intel CPUs, can sometimes perform suboptimally on AMD CPUs. rocBLAS, on the other hand, is specifically optimized for AMD GPUs and CPUs, providing a performance boost on AMD hardware.

Why Mix rocBLAS and MKL?

  • rocBLAS: Optimized for AMD GPUs (and CPUs via ROCm stack).
  • MKL: Optimized for Intel CPUs, but still useful for certain CPU-bound tasks.
  • Mixing: You can selectively use each library for the operations where it performs best.

– END-

Network (Protocol, Topology & Standard), Potential Risk of CVE

CVE-2025-30403: A heap-buffer-overflow vulnerability is possible in mvfst via a specially crafted message during a QUIC session. (13th Jul 2025)

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Preface: mvfst (Pronounced move fast) is a client and server implementation of IETF QUIC protocol in C++ by Facebook. QUIC is a UDP based reliable, multiplexed transport protocol that will become an internet standard.

Background: QUIC (Quick UDP Internet Connections), was designed with the primary goal of enhancing the speed and reliability of internet connections, particularly for latency-sensitive and bandwidth-intensive applications. It aims to reduce connection setup time, improve data transfer speeds, and enhance security compared to traditional TCP and TLS protocols.

The QUIC protocol is a key component in modern CDN (Content Delivery Network) strategies, particularly with the rise of HTTP/3. QUIC, developed by Google and standardized by the IETF, is a transport layer protocol that offers significant performance and security improvements over traditional TCP, especially in the context of CDNs.

Vulnerability details: A heap-buffer-overflow vulnerability is possible in mvfst via a specially crafted message during a QUIC session. This issue affects mvfst versions prior to v2025.07.07.00.

Does removing maxBatchSize affect performance?

Yes, potentially.

To offset any performance degradation from removing maxBatchSize, CDNs may:

-Optimize packet scheduling and batching elsewhere in the QUIC stack to maintain throughput.

-Use adaptive batching: Dynamically adjust how many packets are processed based on system load and traffic patterns.

-Deploy hardware acceleration: Offload QUIC processing to specialized hardware (e.g., SmartNICs or FPGAs).

-Leverage edge caching: Reduce the need for frequent QUIC connections by serving more content directly from edge nodes.

Official announcement: Please refer to the url  for details – https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-30403

AI and ML, System

Nvidia security focus – Rowhammer attack potential risk – July 2025 (11th July 2025)

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Preface: The Rowhammer effect, a hardware vulnerability in DRAM chips, was first publicly presented and analyzed in June 2014 at the International Symposium on Computer Architecture (ISCA). This research, conducted by Yoongu Kim et al., demonstrated that repeatedly accessing a specific row in a DRAM chip can cause bit flips in nearby rows, potentially leading to security breaches.

Background: Nvidia has shifted from “copy on flip” to asynchronous copy mechanisms in their GPU architecture, particularly with the Ampere architecture and later. This change allows for more efficient handling of data transfers between memory and the GPU, reducing latency and improving overall performance, especially in scenarios with high frame rates or complex computations.

When System-Level ECC is enabled, it prevents attackers from successfully executing Rowhammer attacks by ensuring memory integrity. The memory controller detects and corrects bit flips, making it nearly impossible for an attacker to exploit them for privilege escalation or data corruption.

Technical details: Modern DRAMs, including the ones used by NVIDIA, are potentially susceptible to Rowhammer. The now decade-old Rowhammer problem has been well known for CPU memories (e.g., DDR, LPDDR). Recently, researchers at the University of Toronto demonstrated a successful Rowhammer exploitation on a NVIDIA A6000 GPU with GDDR6 memory where System-Level ECC was not enabled. In the same paper, the researchers showed that enabling System-Level ECC mitigates the Rowhammer problem. 

Official announcement: Technical details: see link – https://nvidia.custhelp.com/app/answers/detail/a_id/5671

Potential Risk of CVE, System

CVE-2025-32462 – Local Privilege Escalation via chroot option (10th July 2025)

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Preface: Using LDAP to manage sudoers rules is becoming a more common practice, particularly in larger organizations. It offers several advantages over traditional methods of storing sudoers in a local file, including simplified management, improved scalability, and enhanced security.

Background:

Best Practices for Using sudo.

  • Avoid Logging in as Root: Use sudo instead of su to minimize security risks.
  • Grant Minimal Permissions: Assign only the necessary privileges to prevent unauthorized access.
  • Monitor sudo Usage: Check logs for suspicious activity

This helps to minimize security risks associated with elevated privileges.

* Specific commands: Instead of ALL=(ALL:ALL), grant access to specific commands only. For example, jane ALL=(ALL:ALL) /usr/bin/apt update, /usr/bin/apt upgrade

Vulnerability details: Sudo before 1.9.17p1, when used with a sudoers file that specifies a host that is neither the current host nor ALL, allows listed users to execute commands on unintended machines.

This vulnerability occurs when a sudoers file specifies a host that is neither the current host nor ALL. In such cases, sudo may incorrectly allow listed users to execute commands on unintended machines.

This is a configuration-based logic flaw rather than a memory corruption or privilege escalation bug. It does not involve CHROOT directly, but rather the host-specific rule matching in sudoers.

Official announcement: Please see the link for details – https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-32462

AI and ML, IoT, Potential Risk of CVE, System, Under our observation

AMD releases details about Transient Scheduler Attack (TSA) – 9 Jul 2025

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Preface: CPU transient instructions refer to instructions that are speculatively executed by a processor’s out-of-order execution engine, but which may ultimately be discarded and not reflected in the processor’s architectural state. These instructions are executed based on predictions about control flow or data dependencies, and if the prediction is incorrect, the results of these transient instructions are discarded.

Background: Transient Scheduler Attacks (TSA) are new speculative side channel attacks related to the execution timing of instructions under specific microarchitectural conditions. In some cases, an attacker may be able to use this timing information to infer data from other contexts, resulting in information leakage.

Vulnerability details:

CVE-2024-36350 – A transient execution vulnerability in some AMD processors may allow an attacker to infer data from previous stores, potentially resulting in the leakage of privileged information.

CVE-2024-36357 – A transient execution vulnerability in some AMD processors may allow an attacker to infer data in the L1D cache, potentially resulting in the leakage of sensitive information across privileged boundaries.

CVE-2024-36348 – A transient execution vulnerability in some AMD processors may allow a user process to infer the control registers speculatively even if UMIP[3] feature is enabled, potentially resulting in information leakage.

CVE-2024-36349 – A transient execution vulnerability in some AMD processors may allow a user process to infer TSC_AUX even when such a read is disabled, potentially resulting in information leakage.

Official announcement: Please see the link for details –

https://www.amd.com/en/resources/product-security/bulletin/amd-sb-7029.html

Cell Phone (iPhone, Android, windows mobile), IoT, Potential Risk of CVE

CVE-2025-21432: Double Free in SPS-HLOS (8th July 2025)

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Preface: Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) is a binary data serialization format loosely based on JSON authored by Carsten Bormann. The use of Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) in SPS HLOS (and other constrained environments) is primarily due to its ability to provide a compact, efficient, and extensible binary data format. This makes it suitable for resource-constrained devices and networks, where bandwidth and processing power are limited. 

Background: In Adreno GPUs, SPS (Shader Processors) HLOS refers to a specific architecture or organization within the GPU where Shader Processors are grouped and managed. “HLOS” likely stands for “High Level Operating System”, indicating that these SPS are managed by the system’s main operating system (like Android) rather than being directly controlled by the GPU’s internal firmware. This means the CPU and operating system handle the overall workload and scheduling for these shader processors.

Ref: CBOR data, from the perspective of a Transfer Agent (TA), refers to data formatted using the Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) standard, likely used for efficient and compact representation of information related to financial transactions or other assets managed by the TA. 

Vulnerability details: Memory corruption while retrieving the CBOR data from TA (Transfer Agent).

Summary:

Component – Qualcomm Adreno GPU (Graphics Driver)

Vulnerability Type – Double Free / Memory Corruption

Trigger – Occurs during CBOR data retrieval from shader memory by the Transfer Agent (TA).

Affected Subsystem: SPS-HLOS (Shader Processor System managed by High-Level OS)

Impact:

Double free condition in shared memory buffers.

Potential for arbitrary code execution or privilege escalation.

Exploitable via crafted GPU workloads or malicious apps using OpenCL/Vulkan.

Official announcement: Please see the link for details – https://docs.qualcomm.com/product/publicresources/securitybulletin/july-2025-bulletin.html

Cell Phone (iPhone, Android, windows mobile), IoT, Potential Risk of CVE

CVE-2025-21450: Improper Authentication in GPS GNSS (7th July 2025)

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Preface:

GNSS – This is a global term encompassing all satellite constellations that provide positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) services. Besides GPS, other GNSS include GLONASS (Russia), Galileo (EU), and BeiDou (China).

GPS – The Global Positioning System, developed by the US Department of Defense, is the most widely recognized and used GNSS. It was the first global satellite navigation system and has become a household term.

Background: A GPS/GNSS receiver can be considered the client in a similar way to an IoT device or smartphone, particularly when used for location-based services. GPS/GNSS receivers require cryptographic downloads, specifically key material and potentially software updates, to enable authentication and anti-spoofing features. These features ensure the integrity and authenticity of the received signals, protecting against malicious attacks like spoofing where fake signals mimic legitimate satellites.

Ref: The GPS module in the Snapdragon 8 Gen 3 is integrated within the Snapdragon X75 5G Modem-RF System. The X75 is a comprehensive modem-RF solution that includes not only 5G capabilities but also other wireless technologies like Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, and location services like GPS. This integration allows for efficient and high-performance location tracking and navigation on devices powered by the Snapdragon 8 Gen 3.

Vulnerability details: Cryptographic issue occurs due to use of insecure connection method while downloading.

Vulnerability Type: CWE-287 Improper Authentication

Official announcement: Please see the link for details –

https://docs.qualcomm.com/product/publicresources/securitybulletin/july-2025-bulletin.html

IoT, Potential Risk of CVE

CVE-2025-52496: Mbed TLSan open-source C library design weakness (6th July 2025)

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Preface: What is the difference between FreeRTOS and Cmsis-RTOS?

Basically FreeRTOS is a RTOS, while CMSIS-RTOS is only a wrapper for any RTOS (like FreeRTOS, CMSIS-RTOS RTX or anything you want). CMSIS-RTOS is an API that enables consistent software layers with middleware and library components. Mbed TLS aims to provide a set of powerful and flexible cryptographic and security building blocks, mainly for embedded systems, focusing on ease of integration and security. The design objective strives to be lean,  prioritizing readability, documentation and testability, while minimizing dependencies and providing a loosely coupled architecture. This allows developers to integrate only the necessary components without the overhead of the entire library.

Background: Do multi-threaded programs use the same AES key?

Yes, multithreaded programs using AES encryption typically use the same AES key for both encryption and decryption, as AES is a symmetric encryption algorithm. Both the sender and receiver need to share the same secret key to encrypt and decrypt data. In a multithreaded context, each thread would utilize this shared key when performing encryption or decryption operations.

Vulnerability details: Mbed TLS before 3.6.4 has a race condition in AESNI detection if certain compiler optimizations occur. An attacker may be able to extract an AES key from a multithreaded program, or perform a GCM forgery.

Official announcement: Please refer to the link for details – https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-52496

IoT, Potential Risk of CVE

CVE-2025-6073 – Industrial Controls Be Aware! (4th July 2025)

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Preface: The default configuration of the ABB RMC-100’s REST interface is disabled. ABB recommends leaving the REST interface disabled when not in use, particularly when configuring MQTT functionality. The RMC-100 is not intended for access over public networks.

Background: The ABB RMC-100 is a popular and widely used remote modular controller, particularly within the oil and gas industry. It is known for its scalability and ability to manage automation, liquids and gas measurement, and asset data concentration for various facility sizes, from large production and transmission facilities to smaller systems. The RMC-100 is part of ABB’s Totalflow portfolio, which has seen over 430,000 units sold since the 1980s.

Service available in some Totalflow devices like the RMC-100. When enabled, the device REST server capabilities are enabled. The device then can be accessed by a REST client such as a web browser. The access is for the configuration of the MQTT parameters.

Uses HTTP methods (protocol) to access resources on a REST server. For example, the web browser which accesses the MQTT configuration interface on the RMC-100.

Vulnerability details: Stack-based Buffer Overflow vulnerability in ABB RMC-100, ABB RMC-100 LITE. When the REST interface is enabled by the user, and an attacker gains access to the control network, and user/password broker authentication is enabled, and CVE-2025-6074 is exploited, the attacker can overflow the buffer for username or password.

Affected Products: This issue affects RMC-100: from 2105457-043 through 2105457-045; RMC-100 LITE: from 2106229-015 through 2106229-016.

Official announcement: Please see the link for details –

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-6073