In-depth analysis of the Android 0-Click vulnerability – CVE-2025-48593. The issue has been resolved.  (20th Nov 2025)

Published: 2025-11-17

Preface: An HFP (Hands-Free Profile) device is a Bluetooth device that supports the Hands-Free Profile, which allows for hands-free calling and control of a mobile phone, such as a car’s infotainment system or a wireless headset. It enables features like answering, making, and ending calls, as well as voice dialing and call waiting, using the paired phone’s microphone and speaker.

Background: Unlike many security threats that require users to click on malicious links or download files, this vulnerability operates silently without any user intervention.

Android’s Bluetooth module is responsible for managing the device’s Bluetooth protocol stack and settings. This module is part of the AOSP open-source code library and is used by the Android system and manufacturer firmware. Android’s Bluetooth functionality fundamentally relies on a modified Linux kernel, which is the core of the Android operating system. The device drivers for hardware components like Bluetooth reside within the kernel system. In the affected version, the HF client module lacks necessary state and boundary checks when handling the Bluetooth device discovery database. The suspicious part is that bta_hf_client_scb_init() is called during registration and also after disable, and if the timer callback is still active during this transition, it could access freed or partially reinitialized memory.

Vulnerability details: CVE-2025-48593 – In bta_hf_client_cb_init of bta_hf_client_main[.]cc, there is a possible remote code execution due to a use after free. This could lead to remote code execution with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation.

Official announcement: Please refer to the link for details – https://www.tenable.com/cve/CVE-2025-48593

CVE-2025-52538: About AMD Xilinx Run Time (XRT) 19th Nov 2025

Last updated: November 11, 2025

Preface: AMD Xilinx refers to the former independent company Xilinx, which was acquired by Advanced Micro Devices (AMD) in February 2022.

Xilinx’s current and past product lines include: Field-Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs), System-on-Chip (SoC) Devices, Adaptive Compute Acceleration Platforms (ACAPs), Data Center Accelerator Cards & System-on-Modules (SoMs).

Xilinx provides countless meta layers that enable developers to build all the necessary components for running Linux on Xilinx SoCs.

Background: In XRT, the xocl driver manages device memory through the abstraction of buffer objects (BOs), which are allocated using specific I/O control (ioctl) commands from user space via the XRT core library APIs. User-facing applications do not directly interact with kernel functions, but use the XRT API to manage memory.

Device memory allocation is modeled as buffer objects (bo). For each bo driver tracks the host pointer backed by scatter gather list – which provides backing storage on host – and the corresponding device side allocation of contiguous buffer in one of the memory mapped DDRs/BRAMs, etc.

Remark: The xocl driver is a key Linux kernel component of XRT specifically designed for PCIe-based platforms, managing user-facing functions and communication with the FPGA.

Vulnerability details: CVE-2025-52538 – Improper input validation within the XOCL driver may allow a local attacker to generate an integer overflow condition, potentially resulting in loss of confidentiality or availability.

From a cybersecurity perspective:

•       The XOCL driver manages device memory via buffer objects (BOs) and uses ioctl commands for allocation.

•       The vulnerability occurs because size calculations for BOs were not properly validated, leading to potential overflow when adding offsets or sizes.

•       AMD’s patch reportedly adds stricter input validation and bounds checking before performing arithmetic operations.

Official announcement: Please refer to the link for details –

https://www.amd.com/en/resources/product-security/bulletin/amd-sb-8014.html

CVE-2025-42890 – Design flaws of SQL Anywhere Monitor (18th Nov 2025)

NVD Last Modified: 11/12/2025

Preface: The original graphical interface for the SQL Anywhere Monitor relied on Adobe Flash, which reached its end-of-life in December 2020. Consequently, the GUI interface is no longer provided in modern versions, and users must use non-GUI methods. SAP recommends using SAP SQL Anywhere Cockpit or SAP Solution Manager as modern, supported tools to replace the legacy SQL Anywhere Monitor for comprehensive monitoring requirements.

Background: Sybase SQL Anywhere (now renamed SAP SQL Anywhere) allows hardcoding credentials in various profiles, connection strings, and scripts, but this poses serious security risks and is strongly discouraged. Passwords stored in this way are typically in plaintext or only slightly obfuscated, making them easily accessible to unauthorized users.

ODBC Data Sources (DSNs): The Windows ODBC Data Source Administrator allows saving the username and password in the DSN configuration.

Ref: SAP SQL Anywhere has historically been a popular choice for specific use cases due to its strengths in embedded and mobile applications with intermittent connectivity. However, its overall market popularity has declined, and it is generally considered a legacy system, with mainstream maintenance ending in the near future (around 2028).

Vulnerability details: SQL Anywhere Monitor (Non-GUI) baked credentials into the code,exposing the resources or functionality to unintended users and providing attackers with the possibility of arbitrary code execution.This could cause high impact on confidentiality integrity and availability of the system.

Official announcement: Please refer to the link for details –

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-42890

CVE-2025-33185: About NVIDIA AIStore  (17th Nov 2025)

Official Updated 10th Nov 2025 05:39 AM

Preface: The core design objective of NVIDIA AIStore (AIS) is to provide a high-performance, linearly scalable, and flexible storage solution specifically optimized for large-scale AI/ML and data analytics workloads. NVIDIA AIStore (AIS) provides secure access via a standalone Authentication Server (AuthN) that uses OAuth 2.0 compliant JSON Web Tokens (JWT) for token-based authentication.

The AuthN server is part of the broader NVIDIA AIStore project, which is publicly available on GitHub. It provides token-based secure access using the JSON Web Tokens (JWT) framework.

Background: The security of a signed JWT relies on a secret key (for HMAC algorithms like HS256) or a public/private key pair (for RSA or ECDSA). This key is used to create a digital signature that ensures the token’s integrity and authenticity—proving it has not been tampered with. If the application’s source code, configuration files, or version control system contains this secret key in plain text, it violates the principle of confidentiality for credentials. An attacker who discovers this hard-coded secret.

Vulnerability details: NVIDIA AIStore contains a vulnerability in AuthN. A successful exploit of this vulnerability might lead to escalation of privileges, information disclosure, and data tampering.

Impacts: Escalation of privileges, information disclosure, data tampering

Remediation: Updated to v3.31

Official announcement: Please refer to the link for details –

https://nvidia.custhelp.com/app/answers/detail/a_id/5724

CVE-2025-33202: About NVIDIA Triton Inference Server (14th Nov 2025)

Official Updated 11/10/2025 05:39 AM

Preface: Clients can communicate with Triton using either an HTTP/REST protocol, a GRPC protocol, or by an in-process C API or its C++ wrapper. Triton supports HTTP/REST and gRPC, both of which involve complex header parsing.

In the context of the Open Inference Protocol (OIP), also known as KServe V2 Protocol. The protocol defines a standardized interface for model inference, which implies that compliant inference servers must be capable of parsing incoming requests and serializing outgoing responses according to the protocol’s defined message formats.

Background: To define a parser that filters the payload for Triton using the KServe V2 (Open Inference Protocol), you need to handle the following:

Key Considerations

1.Protocol Compliance – The parser must understand the OIP message format:

-Inference Request: Includes inputs, outputs, parameters.

-Inference Response: Includes model_name, outputs, parameters.

-Data can be in JSON (for REST) or Protobuf (for gRPC).

2.Filtering Logic – Decide what you want to filter:

-Specific tensor names?

-Certain data types (e.g., FP32, INT64)?

-Large payloads (e.g., skip tensors above a size threshold)?

-Security checks (e.g., reject malformed headers)?

3.Shared Memory Handling – If shared memory is used, the parser should:

-Validate shared_memory_region references.

-Ensure the payload does not redundantly include tensor data when shared memory is specified.

Vulnerability details: NVIDIA Triton Inference Server for Linux and Windows contains a vulnerability where an attacker could cause a stack overflow by sending extra-large payloads. A successful exploit of this vulnerability might lead to denial of service.

Official announcement: Please see the official link for details –

https://nvidia.custhelp.com/app/answers/detail/a_id/5723

CVE‑2025‑23361 and CVE-2025-33178: NVIDIA Nemo Framework contains vulnerabilities (13th Nov 2025)

Preface: The advantages of using Hydra and OmegaConf for configuration management are flexibility, reproducibility, and scalability. Hydra’s ability to override configurations at runtime from the command line and compose them from multiple sources makes it highly flexible.

NeMo uses Hydra/OmegaConf for configuration management, which supports interpolation and sometimes dynamic evaluation.

Background: NVIDIA NeMo is an end-to-end platform designed for developing and deploying generative AI models. This includes large language models (LLMs), vision language models (VLMs), video models, and speech AI. NeMo offers tools for data curation, fine-tuning, retrieval-augmented generation (RAG), and inference, making it a comprehensive solution for creating enterprise-ready AI models. Here are some key capabilities of NeMo LLMs:

  1. Customization: NeMo allows you to fine-tune pre-trained models to suit specific enterprise needs. This includes adding domain-specific knowledge and skills, and continuously improving the model with reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF).
  2. Scalability: NeMo supports large-scale training and deployment across various environments, including cloud, data centers, and edge devices. This ensures high performance and flexibility for different use cases.
  3. Foundation Models: NeMo offers a range of pre-trained foundation models, such as GPT-8, GPT-43, and GPT-530, which can be used for tasks like text classification, summarization, creative writing, and chatbots.
  4. Data Curation: The platform includes tools for processing and curating large datasets, which helps improve the accuracy and relevance of the models.
  5. Integration: NeMo can be integrated with other NVIDIA AI tools and services, providing a comprehensive ecosystem for AI development.

Vulnerability details:

CVE-2025-23361: NVIDIA NeMo Framework for all platforms contains a vulnerability in a script, where malicious input created by an attacker may cause improper control of code generation. A successful exploit of this vulnerability may lead to code execution, escalation of privileges, information disclosure, and data tampering.

CVE-2025-33178: NVIDIA NeMo Framework for all platforms contains a vulnerability in the bert services component where malicious data created by an attacker may cause a code injection. A successful exploit of this vulnerability may lead to Code execution, Escalation of privileges, Information disclosure, and Data tampering.

Ref: CVE-2025-33178 in the BERT services component is conceptually similar to CVE-2025-23361 in the LLM pretraining workflow. Both share the same underlying weakness: unsanitized dynamic code generation or execution based on user-controlled input.

Official announcement: Please see the official link for details – https://nvidia.custhelp.com/app/answers/detail/a_id/5718

Question: A signal of approximately 1.667 GHz from the interstellar object 3I/ATLAS was detected [specifically at 1.665 GHz and 1.667 GHz]. (12th Nov 2025)

Preface: The space between stars is not a complete vacuum; it is filled with a sparse collection of gas and dust called the interstellar medium, which is primarily composed of hydrogen and helium.

Background: When the water ice on a comet is heated by the Sun and vaporizes in the near-vacuum of space, the resulting water molecules in the comet’s coma are dissociated into hydroxyl (OH) radicals and hydrogen atoms (H) primarily by solar ultraviolet (UV) radiation (photodissociation), not just by the heat itself or a simple mixing of oxygen and hydrogen.

The 1.667 GHz frequency is a prominent spectral line associated with the hydroxyl (OH) radical, not neutral hydrogen (H I). The primary, well-known radio emission line of neutral hydrogen is at approximately 1.420 GHz (1420.4 MHz), corresponding to a wavelength of 21 cm. 

The 1.667 GHz line is one of the main lines of the hydroxyl radical, specifically the OH main lines, which are often observed in interstellar medium studies using radio astronomy. These lines (1667 MHz and 1665 MHz) can be used as a probe of molecular gas.

Ref: The hydroxyl (OH) radical can be both naturally and artificially produced. It is generated in the atmosphere by reactions involving UV light and ozone, and in living organisms and industrial processes through mechanisms like the Fenton reaction. Artificial methods are used in applications like advanced oxidation processes for water treatment.

Technical standpoint by Prof. Loeb:

First Radio Signal from 3I/ATLAS: Absorption by Hydroxyl Radicals (OH Molecules) – Please refer to the link for details.

https://avi-loeb.medium.com/first-radio-signal-from-3i-atlas-absorption-by-hydroxyl-radicals-oh-molecules-0e0fc6e54732

CVE-2025-12907: About Devtools in Google Chrome  (12th Nov 2025)

Preface: Google Chrome comes with DevTools built directly into the browser by default. These are a comprehensive set of web developer tools that allow users to inspect and debug web pages, analyze network activity, monitor performance, and much more.

You can use the snippets option available in the Sources tab in Chrome DevTools. Just type out your code as you do in a code editor and hit Ctrl+Enter (or click on the Run snippet button available there) to execute the code, and the output displays in the console at the bottom.

Background: In Chrome DevTools, Copy as cURL is a feature in the Network panel that lets you right-click on a network request and copy it as a curl command. This command replicates the HTTP request outside the browser, including:

  • URL
  • HTTP method (GET, POST, etc.)
  • Headers (cookies, authorization tokens, etc.)
  • Payload (for POST/PUT requests)

Vulnerability details: Insufficient validation of untrusted input in Devtools in Google Chrome prior to 140.0.7339.80 allowed a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code via user action in Devtools. (Chromium security severity: Low)

This CVE refers to a design flaw in Chrome DevTools that could allow unauthorized access or privilege escalation under certain conditions. Based on the advisory, the flaw likely involves:

  • Improper isolation or authentication when DevTools is exposed.
  • Attackers exploiting CDP endpoints without proper permission checks.
Best-Practice Checklist
  1. Always update to Chrome ≥ 140[.]0[.]7339[.]80.
  2. Launch with --remote-debugging-port and --user-data-dir (non-default).
  3. Avoid exposing the CDP port; use localhost only or protected proxies like devtoolium.
  4. Audit DevTools features (e.g., “Copy as cURL”) before exposing them via CDP.
  5. For automation, consider Chrome for Testing for safer, isolated CDP usage.

Official announcement: Please refer to the link for details –

https://www.tenable.com/cve/CVE-2025-12907

CVE-2025-12863: About the libxml2 XML parsing library (11th Nov 2025)

Preface: Libxml2, a C library for parsing and manipulating XML documents, can be relevant in machine learning contexts when dealing with data stored or exchanged in XML format. While not a machine learning library itself, libxml2, or its Python binding lxml, serves as a foundational tool for data preparation and feature engineering.

Ref: The “difference” between Libxml and Libxml2 is that they are essentially the same thing, with “libxml2” being the official and specific name for the library.

Background: Moving nodes between XML documents can happen in machine learning workflows, especially during data integration, comparison, or transformation.  

When would you be at risk?

You’d be at risk if:

  • You use libxml2 or lxml to move nodes from one document to another (e.g., merging XML trees).
  • The underlying library internally calls xmlSetTreeDoc() during such operations.
  • The original document gets freed while namespace pointers still reference it.

Vulnerability details: A flaw was found in the xmlSetTreeDoc() function of the libxml2 XML parsing library. This function is responsible for updating document pointers when XML nodes are moved between documents. Due to improper handling of namespace references, a namespace pointer may remain linked to a freed memory region when the original document is destroyed. As a result, subsequent operations that access the namespace can lead to a use-after-free condition, causing an application crash.

Official announcement: Please refer to the link for details.

https://www.tenable.com/cve/CVE-2025-12863

https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/cve-2025-12863

Can we add more imagination to the 3I/ALTAS (the tail contains an iron-nickel alloy) – 10th Nov 2025

Preface: From the current state, if 3I/ATLAS is not a comet, but it did not travel with different dimensions. Therefore, it is possible to use thrusters.

Background: The nickel-iron alloys are used in components like reactor vessels and steam generators because they can withstand the extreme temperatures, pressures, and neutron bombardment within a reactor, and also have properties that are important for reactor longevity and safety. As a matter of fact, components of nickel-iron alloys (specifically their corrosion products) do appear in the cooling system steam of nuclear reactors.

Elon Musk made a statement along those lines on “The Joe Rogan Experience” podcast. He essentially argued that using solid nickel to construct a massive spaceship would be an illogical engineering choice due to the material’s weight.

But from a technical standpoint:

Nickel-iron alloy presence in emissions: This would not be in the form of gaseous nickel or iron atoms (they don’t volatilize easily at reactor conditions). Instead, it’s likely aerosolized particles or entrained droplets containing dissolved ions or microscopic corrosion fragments.

Spectral detection: Instruments like ATLAS can pick up elemental signatures in particulate matter, so the tail of the spectrum showing Ni/Fe is consistent with corrosion transport from reactor internals.

Yesterday, Professor Loeb gave a presentation entitled “The Remarkable Large-Scale Structure of Anti-Tail and Tail Jets from 3I/ATLAS.” He has a question for you.

Given these considerations, is 3I/ATLAS of natural or technological origin?

Please refer to the following link for details –

https://avi-loeb.medium.com/the-remarkable-large-scale-structure-of-anti-tail-and-tail-jets-from-3i-atlas-242c534cf7b3

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