Preface: What is D3TN? In 2015, our company was founded under the name “FUSE” to offer dedicated software products for distributed systems. Due to our native interest in networking for challenged environments with an emphasis on space and underwater networks, we started focusing intensively on this field. In July 2018, we renamed the company D3TN, referring to our competences in so-called Delay- and Disruption-tolerant Networking (DTN) technologies. These technologies may be employed to render possible communication in the most challenging environments. We are experts in developing software and hardware solutions for this domain.
Background: The main purpose of NASA’s involvement in Bundle Protocol version 7 (BPv7) is to create a more robust, standard, and interoperable networking protocol for space exploration, enabling the Solar System Internet, lunar networks like LunaNet, and improving data return and communication reliability for all types of space missions. BPv7 builds upon BPv6 by adding essential features for network-layer functionality and standardized interfaces, addressing gaps in the previous standard and paving the way for future, complex space communication architectures.
BPv7 is used in Delay-Tolerant Networking (DTN), as it is the latest version of the Bundle Protocol (BP) and is being implemented in operational systems like the Interplanetary Overlay Network (ION). BPv7 is a more robust and standardized version of the Bundle Protocol (BP) that improves upon its predecessor, BPv6, and enables advanced functionalities like Bundle-in-Bundle Encapsulation (BIBE) to handle both versions concurrently.
Vulnerability details: CVE-2025-61910 state the following: The vulnerability seems to be due to processing the fifth element of the array (i.e., the byte string) as replacing it with a number makes the vulnerability no longer be triggered. While parsing this extension block, ION obtains a very large block length, which in the code in `bei.c`:764) seems to be passed from `blockLength` which is an unsigned int, to a 32 bit signed integer `blkSize`.
The unsigned to signed conversion causes `blkSize` to hold the value of -369092043, which is then converted into a 64-bit unsigned value inside `MTAKE(blkSize)`, resulting in an attempt to allocate an unrealistic amount of memory, causing the error.
Summary:
The CVE description is outdated in practice but accurate in terms of formal release status.
The fix exists in GitHub, but no patched release version has been tagged or published yet.
Users should manually apply the fix or monitor the repository for an official release.
Official announcement: Please see the link for details –