Preface: Google Chrome comes with DevTools built directly into the browser by default. These are a comprehensive set of web developer tools that allow users to inspect and debug web pages, analyze network activity, monitor performance, and much more.

You can use the snippets option available in the Sources tab in Chrome DevTools. Just type out your code as you do in a code editor and hit Ctrl+Enter (or click on the Run snippet button available there) to execute the code, and the output displays in the console at the bottom.

Background: In Chrome DevTools, “Copy as cURL” is a feature in the Network panel that lets you right-click on a network request and copy it as a curl command. This command replicates the HTTP request outside the browser, including:

• URL
• HTTP method (GET, POST, etc.)
• Headers (cookies, authorization tokens, etc.)
• Payload (for POST/PUT requests)

Vulnerability details: Insufficient validation of untrusted input in Devtools in Google Chrome prior to 140.0.7339.80 allowed a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code via user action in Devtools. (Chromium security severity: Low)

This CVE refers to a design flaw in Chrome DevTools that could allow unauthorized access or privilege escalation under certain conditions. Based on the advisory, the flaw likely involves:

• Improper isolation or authentication when DevTools is exposed.
• Attackers exploiting CDP endpoints without proper permission checks.

Best-Practice Checklist

1. Always update to Chrome ≥ 140[.]0[.]7339[.]80.
2. Launch with --remote-debugging-port and --user-data-dir (non-default).
3. Avoid exposing the CDP port; use localhost only or protected proxies like devtoolium.
4. Audit DevTools features (e.g., “Copy as cURL”) before exposing them via CDP.
5. For automation, consider Chrome for Testing for safer, isolated CDP usage.

Official announcement: Please refer to the link for details –

https://www.tenable.com/cve/CVE-2025-12907

Preface: Amazon, Google, Microsoft, Apple, Cloudflare, Coursera, Discord, Dropbox, and Figma are among the large companies employing Rust for various purposes, including cloud infrastructure, operating system components, web services, and low-level security components.

Youki is gaining increasing attention as a container runtime, especially in the Rust ecosystem, but it has not yet achieved the widespread adoption of mature runtimes such as runc or crun.

runc is a common and fundamental component in Docker environments. runc is the default low-level container runtime used by Docker Engine. Kubernetes, through its Container Runtime Interface (CRI), interacts with a CRI-compliant runtime like containerd or CRI-O. So, while Kubernetes doesn’t directly interact with runc, it relies on higher-level runtimes that use runc for the low-level container operations.

Background: A new container runtime in Rust. youki has the potential to be faster and use less memory than runc. While runc’s memory usage during container initialization can be around 2.2-3MB, Youki aims to reduce this footprint.

Rust may not be the primary language for data scientists, but it plays a vital role in providing the underlying infrastructure for training and deploying large AI models.

Vulnerability details: Youki is a container runtime written in Rust. In versions 0.5.6 and below, the initial validation of the source /dev/null is insufficient, allowing container escape when youki utilizes bind mounting the container’s /dev/null as a file mask.

Remedy: This issue is fixed in version 0.5.7.

Official announcement: Please refer to the link for details –

https://www.tenable.com/cve/CVE-2025-62161

Preface: The recent research, released in a paper titled “TEE.fail: Breaking Trusted Execution Environments via DDR5 Memory Bus Interposition”, does not change Intel’s previous out of scope statement for these types of physical attacks.

Background: Intel SGX protects memory by creating encrypted “enclaves,” which are isolated, private regions within an application’s address space. These enclaves are stored in the Enclave Page Cache (EPC) within the processor’s reserved memory (PRM), and the CPU encrypts data as it is written to the EPC and decrypts it on the fly as it’s read from the CPU, preventing unauthorized access from even privileged software like the operating system or hypervisor.

When the CPU writes data to memory, the memory controller uses the plaintext and address as input to deterministically encrypt it. Writing the same plaintext to the same address will always produce the same ciphertext. Attackers cannot directly read a victim’s secret messages through aliasing mechanisms. However, a doctoral researcher at KU Leuven in Belgium claims it is possible to capture a victim’s ciphertext, and then the victim can simply replay the ciphertext at the same physical location to decrypt it into valid but outdated plaintext.

Ref: ACPI Machine Language (AML) is the platform independent code that ACPI utilizes. ASL is ACPI source language. It is a more human-readable form of the byte code that is AML.

For example the OS has a driver for an Embedded Controller device, and AML can actually talk to the OS driver. Or ACPI can reserve certain hardware resources, so that AML can use them directly, and the OS knows it is not allowed to use them.

Vulnerability details: Independent researchers have separately published methods to attack Intel® Software Guard Extensions (Intel® SGX) with a physical interposer device.

In the WireTap paper, researchers from Georgia Tech and Purdue University applied a passive interposer to read ciphertext memory of low entropy data to create a ciphertext-to-plain-text dictionary.

In the Battering RAM paper, researchers from KU Leuven and University of Birmingham developed a custom interposer to actively alias memory and gain arbitrary read/write access into Intel SGX-protected memory.​

Both research teams assume a physical adversary has direct access to the hardware with a memory bus interposer.

Official announcement: Please refer to the link for details – https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/security-center/announcement/intel-security-announcement-2025-10-28-001.html