AMD response to method for privileged attackers with physical access to a motherboard (3rd Oct 2025)

Preface: AMD does not plan to release any mitigations in response to this report because the reported exploit is outside the scope of the published threat model for SEV-SNP.

Remark: A physical attack is not a cyber attack because “cyber” refers to actions within computer networks and digital systems, whereas a physical attack directly involves the physical world, such as breaking into a building or destroying hardware. While a physical attack can lead to cyber vulnerabilities or data breaches, the act itself is not inherently digital.

Background: SEV-SNP is a TEE that protects the confidentiality and integrity of whole VMs against an attacker with root privileges and physical access to the machine, enabling to run SEV-protected VMs without trusting the infrastructure provider and virtualization layers such as the hypervisor.

A Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) is a secure, isolated area within a device’s main processor, protected from the main operating system and other untrusted software. It uses special hardware to create a trusted space (a “secure world”) to run sensitive code and protect data’s confidentiality and integrity. TEEs are used for security-sensitive operations like biometric authentication, secure payments, and protecting private keys in crypto wallets.

The “probe” for Serial Presence Detect (SPD) data on DDR4 and DDR5 modules is an I2C bus and associated protocols that allow the motherboard’s firmware (BIOS) to read an EEPROM chip on the memory module.

How the Attack Works?

1.Attacker gains physical access to the system and modifies the SPD data.

2.They falsely report a larger memory size than actually exists.

3.This causes the memory controller to use ghost address bits, creating aliasing — multiple physical addresses pointing to the same memory location.

4.The attacker can then:

-Overwrite encrypted guest memory.

-Inject malicious data into memory regions.

-Bypass SEV-SNP’s memory integrity protections, which assume correct physical mappings.

Official announcement: For more details, please refer to the link –

https://www.amd.com/en/resources/product-security/bulletin/amd-sb-3024.html

CVE-2025-10657: About Enhanced Container Isolation (2nd Oct 2025)

Preface: Standardized AI/ML model packaging: With OCI artifacts, models can be versioned, distributed, and tracked like container images. This promotes consistency and traceability across environments.Docker Desktop, specifically through its Docker Model Runner feature, can be used to run various AI models, particularly Large Language Models (LLMs) and other AI models that can be packaged as OCI Artifacts.

OCI Artifacts are any arbitrary files associated with software applications, extending the standardized OCI (Open Container Initiative) image format to include content beyond container images, such as Helm charts, Software Bill of Materials (SBOMs), digital signatures, and provenance data. These artifacts leverage the same fundamental OCI structure of manifest, config, and layers and are stored and distributed using OCI-compliant registries and tools like the ORAS CLI.

Background: A container desktop, such as Docker Desktop, acts as a local development environment and a management host for CI/CD pipelines by providing consistent, isolated environments for building, testing, and deploying containerized applications. It enables developers to package applications with their dependencies into portable containers, eliminating “works on my machine” issues and ensuring application uniformity across development, testing, and production. This simplifies the entire software delivery process, accelerating the development lifecycle by integrating container management directly into the developer’s workflow.

Vulnerability details: In a hardened Docker environment, with Enhanced Container Isolation ( ECI https://docs.docker.com/enterprise/security/hardened-desktop/enhanced-container-isolation/ ) enabled, an administrator can utilize the command restrictions feature https://docs.docker.com/enterprise/security/hardened-desktop/enhanced-container-isolation/config/#command-restrictions  to restrict commands that a container with a Docker socket mount may issue on that socket. Due to a software bug, the configuration to restrict commands was ignored when passed to ECI, allowing any command to be executed on the socket. This grants excessive privileges by permitting unrestricted access to powerful Docker commands. The vulnerability affects only Docker Desktop 4.46.0 users that have ECI enabled and are using the Docker socket command restrictions feature. In addition, since ECI restricts mounting the Docker socket into containers by default, it only affects containers which are explicitly allowed by the administrator to mount the Docker socket.

Official announcement: For more details, please see the link –

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-10657